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Abstract 
Although China is rapidly developing economically, militarily, and socially, it remains an 
authoritarian country. Since the diplomatic breakthrough by Richard Nixon with China in 
1972, successive administrations in Washington have held out the hope to American 
citizens that China inevitably would democratize. Because of China's economic and 
growing military power in the international arena, the United States government and 
other free nations believe that it is important to urge the Chinese government to be 
responsible in terms of its protection of human rights and support of other democratic 
tenets, domestically and internationally, as well as to be a role model for other 
developing-nation governments in its friendly coexistence with the West and adherence 
to international norms. However, the central government and most citizens of China do 
not see the need for their country to democratize along the lines of Western democracy. 
This thesis explores why China is unlikely to democratize in the foreseeable future, even 
if there is continued modernization and further growth of China's middle class. It 
provides a definition of democracy against which the political realities of China are 
measured. Lack of religious freedom, a poor track record on human rights, and 
ineffective pro-democracy movements are closely analyzed. There have been various 
projections that the rising middle class eventually will demand political participation and, 
therefore, that China will move assuredly toward Western-style democratization. The 
thesis argues that this scenario is not likely, in part because the rising middle class lacks 
a basic understanding and appreciation of the fundamentals of democracy, as revealed by 
"pro-democracy" movements such as the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, that in fact 
did not seek Western-style liberal democracy. Particularly in the case of 1989, the 
movement was an opportunity for participating students to challenge the government to 
vi 
meet their needs, rather than a demand for a fundamental change in China's authoritarian 
political system. Since 1989, the "pro-democracy" movement has all but vanished, and 
members of the middle class seemingly have become advocates of preservation of the 
authoritarian status quo. This could change if current economic realities in China become 
harsher, but indications for now point to the continuation of China as an authoritarian 
one-party state. 
vii 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The care of human life and happiness, and not their destruction, 
is the first and only object of good government. 
-Thomas Jefferson to Maryland Republicans, 1809. 
Thomas Jefferson and other founding fathers of the United States were responsible for 
establishing a political system of governance called democracy. The meaning of Western- 
style democracy is resisted and sometimes misunderstood by countries that criticize this 
form of government. In authoritarian countries such as the People's Republic of China 
(PRC), there is little basic understanding of the fundamentals of democracy as they are 
known and practiced in East Asia's five countries that are rated as liberal democracies 
(Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines), let alone in the West, 
where democracy is much more firmly rooted. The democratic movements in China that 
were led by mostly educated members of the middle class were largely a response to 
problems in economic transition, rather than aimed at securing democracy in China. None 
of the democracy movements ever called for the overturn of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). With the exception of Wei Jingsheng's call for a fifth modernization, 
democracy, during the Democracy Wall Movement of 1978-1979, these movements were 
chiefly an expression of misapprehension about changing economic and social conditions, 
as well as calls for the government to meet the needs of the protesters. Taking into 
consideration Beijing's political repression, including suppression of student movements, 
persecution of religious groups whose activities are not controlled by the government, 
alleged proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, unfair trade practices, and demand 
for the continued one-party state, it is fair to say that China remains absolutist and 
unlikely to lean toward democracy in the near future. 1 
For nearly a century, China's leaders and the government have promised its 
people some form of democracy. However, the term democracy was understood 
differently by Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping,2 and in none of these cases 
did the leader understand democracy as it was embraced in the West. Sun Yat-sen's 
vision of democracy was colored by the ideas of Confucius, and he "added Western 
elements only when they were useful to the Chinese environment. "3 Confronted with a 
disastrous beginning to the Republic of China, founded in 1912, Sun proposed a three- 
phase process to achieve self-government after a revolutionary party won control of 
power: (1) a three-year period of military rule followed by, (2) political tutelage 
government under a revolutionary party, and, eventually, (3) self-rule, governed by a 
republican constitution. Phases one and two unfortunately resulted in a party dictatorship 
led by Chiang Kai-shek.4 Mao Zedong promised a new China, which would ensure a 
democratic dictatorship under the proletariat. In his famous essay, "The People's 
Democratic Dictatorship," Mao suggested that, in order to abolish classes and create 
I Minxin Pei, "Is China Democratizing?"Foreign Affairs (January/February 1998) http://proquest.umi.com. 
ezproxy.shu.edu/pqdweb?index=7 &did=25 I I 2129&SrchMode=3&sid= l&Fmt=4& Vlnst= PROD& VType= 
PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=l232313374&clientld=5171&aid=I (accessed January 18, 2009). 
2 John L. Thorton, "Long Time Coming: The Prospect for Democracy in China," Foreign Affairs 
(January/February 2008), http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080 IO I faessay87 IO l/john-1-thornton/Iong-time­ 
coming.html (accessed February I, 2009). 
3 Eric Chiyeung, "Building Constitutional Democracy on Oriental Foundations: An Autonomy of Sun Yat­ 
sen's Constitutionalism," http://hc.rediris.es/09/articulos/pdf/16.pdf (accessed February I, 2009). 
4 
Edmund S. K. Fung, In Search of Chinese Democracy: Civil Opposition in Communist China 1929-1949 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 31 .  
2 
Great Harmony, socialist and communist society would have to be established.5 In the 
process, Mao led China into class warfare that destroyed the lives of millions of victims. 
Deng Xiaoping led China out of the anarchy of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 
and declared that "democracy was a major condition for emancipating the mind.t" Yet, 
he issued the Four Cardinal Principles in March 1979, precisely to prevent consideration 
of political liberalization, and repeatedly suppressed movements that were characterized 
as democratic in China, including the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. Despite the 
various manifestations of China's so-called democracy, defined differently by different 
leaders, China remains an authoritarian country. In truth, "democracy in its most general 
sense has never actually been tried in China."7 The Chinese Communist Party has full 
control of political power, and China lacks many freedoms, as well as other fundamentals 
of a true democracy. 
The chapters ahead explore the nature of China's authoritarian regime, and 
analyze the reasons why China is unlikely to experience political liberalization in the 
foreseeable future, despite the predications of American presidential administrations, 
going back to Richard Nixon's in the 1970s. Although successive administrations since 
Nixon's have held out hope to the American public that China's steps toward democracy 
have been inevitable, realities in China have shown little evidence that any generation of 
communist leadership, including the current fourth generation led by Hu Jintao, has been 
inclined toward power sharing and placing its confidence in the hands of the people. 
5 R. Keith Schoppa, The Columbia Guide to Modern Chinese History (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1943), 293. 
6 Thorton, "Long Time Coming: The Prospect for Democracy in China." 
"Andrew Nathan, China's Transition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 63. 
3 
Chapter2 
China's Failure to Liberalize: 
Lack of a Fundamental Understanding of Democracy 
The definition of democracy that underlines the analysis of this thesis is based on a 
Western view of a democratic political system, which challenges the control of power of 
authoritarian governments such as China's. On December 10, 1948, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,' to 
promote peace, freedom, and justice in the world. The Declaration is based on Western- 
style concepts of democracy, which encourage freedom of speech and expression of 
individualism by each human being. All countries that are members of the United Nations 
are expected to honor and promote these values. China, one of the five members of the 
Security Council at the United Nations, has historically violated and continues to 
disregard them. It has failed to establish a political system that protects human rights, and 
its one-party system twists the accepted understanding of Western-style democracy, using 
the term "democracy" in its own contorted fashion. For example, village elections in 
China are controlled by state officials. Each participant has a voting record known by the 
government, and most of the time the elected officials are Chinese Communist Party 
members. As further example, according to the Chinese Constitution, all China's citizens 
have a "right to the freedom ofreligious belief." Yet, each year, a number ofleaders and 
members from the Catholic, Protestant, Islamic, and Tibetan Buddhist faiths are sent to 
prisons or labor camps. The Falun Gong, whose members practice a mixture of Taoist 
I United Nations, "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights," http://www.un.org/Overview/rig 
hts.html#a30 (accessed February 17, 2009). 
4 
and Buddhist beliefs, was declared an "evil cult" in 1999 and targeted for severe 
suppression. Falun Gong members often have been tortured inhumanly, and in many 
instances, they have died, owed to the brutality. State officials, who control the media, 
falsely accuse religionists and their movements and groups of being disruptive to society, 
when in reality the Chinese government does not uphold the freedoms and rights that the 
Chinese Constitution allegedly provides. The media is a mechanism to advance the 
government's control. For example, in an article of December 2008, China Daily 
clarified the concept ofreligious freedom in the PRC: "Freedom of religious belief does 
not mean religious activities are also free from government regulation or legal obligations. 
To believe in a religion or not is a personal issue and a free choice, but religious activities, 
which might affect other people, must be bound by law."2 In sum, if the Chinese 
government declares that a religion is disturbing to society or that it is an evil cult, state 
officials have the right to imprison or otherwise harm the members of the offending 
religious group. 
China's Malformations of Democracy 
Internationally, China sides with the regimes of countries such as Sudan, Pakistan, Iran, 
Venezuela, Myanmar, and Russia that are internationally condemned for violating human 
and civil rights. Western countries, such as the United States, stopped oil trade with 
Sudan and banned weapons sales to Venezuela in protest against abuses by the regimes. 
For decades, China has financed the Sudanese government, which has used the funding to 
kill innocent civilians in Darfur. In February 2009, China and Venezuela agreed to 
2 Liu Hongji, "A Breach of Constitution under Pretext of Religion," China Daily, December 5, 2008, 
http://www.chinadaily.corn.cn/opinion/2008-12/05/content_ 72745 l O.htm (accessed February 18, 2009). 
5 
"double their joint investment fund to $12 billion and signed a raft of agreements to boost 
co-operation." The Chinese government claims that trade and friendly relations with 
countries that violate human rights are not based on politics, but rather on economics. 
Not only does China support dictatorships abroad that deny their citizens the 
chance for human fulfillment, but also Chinese officials misconstrue the definition of 
democracy in China, by claiming that China endorses democratic values, yet 
undermining basic fundamentals that make up a stable democratic political system, such 
as free, fair, and frequent elections, public control of the national agenda, and the 
protection of human rights as well as religious and other freedoms. Democracy originated 
in the West. It has been adopted in former British colonies such as India, Canada, and 
Australia, and is popular even in Hong Kong, where there has been a vigorous democracy 
movement, albeit the region is not a democracy. It spread, heavily influenced by the 
United States," to Japan, during the American occupation following World War II, and to 
South Korea and Taiwan, in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. Western philosophers 
such as John Locke and John Stuart Mill promoted Western-style democracy by fostering 
the concept of natural rights and limits on government. These concepts have helped to 
cultivate political stability and prosperity where they have been embraced. At the time of 
Hong Kong's retrocession to China's sovereignty, Christopher Patten, Hong Kong's last 
British governor, noted: 
Freedom, democracy, the rule of law, stability, and prosperity are found 
most frequently in one another's company. The relationship between these 
aspects of the good and open society will be tested in all parts of Asia, but 
3 "China and Venezuela Boost Links," BBC News Online, February 19, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7898809.stm (accessed February 19, 2009). 
4 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge, MA: 
University of Oklahoma, 1993), 299. 
6 
most fiercely in China, whose die-hard leadership is intent on 
demonstrating that Leninism and capitalism can happily co-exist. 5 
Defining Western-Style Democracy 
Before beginning a discussion of democracy in China, it is important to define democracy 
in general terms according to a Western view, in order to analyze the different concept of 
"democracy" that is espoused by China's government and generally by mainland Chinese 
people. Effective participation and free, fair, and frequent elections are two fundamentals 
of democracy in the West. Citizens have an equal opportunity to elect their leaders, thus 
they can participate in shaping the national agenda. Through free, fair, and frequent 
elections, citizens can have their voices heard, and elect a leader whom the majority of 
the people want. These and other fundamental concepts of democracy are essential in the 
democratic political system not only to protect citizens from the abuses of an 
authoritarian government, but also to provide essential rights, general freedom, self- 
determination, and opportunity for human development. 6 Because countries that have 
transitioned into democracy historically have provided peace and prosperity for their 
citizens," it is unlikely that democratic countries will go to war against each other. To 
date, they have not. 
Democracy protects its citizens from authoritarian governments and dictators who 
are often driven by their paranoia, self-interest, ideology, religious belief, or just by a 
' Christopher Pattern, East and West: China, Power, and the Future of Asia (New York: Time Books, 
Random House, 1998), xii. 
6 Robert Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 45. 
7 Ibid. 
7 
plain impulse.8 "Under Joseph Stalin's rule in the Soviet Union (1929-1953), many 
millions of persons were jailed for political reasons often because of Stalin's paranoid 
fear of conspiracies against him. "9 Adolf Hitler, another autocratic ruler, was driven by 
his ideology that led to the death of tens of millions of people during War World II, and 
was responsible for the deaths of millions of people whom he wished to exterminate." 
Although democracies are based on majority votes, and so-called tyranny of the majority 
is often found in the democratic political system, democracy still protects its citizens 
from autocratic rulers and obeys the ''universal code of human rights that is effectively 
enforced throughout the world."11 
In order for a country to have democracy, there not only must be effective 
participation of adult citizens, and free, fair and frequent elections, but also voting 
equality, enlightened understanding of policies and their consequences, and citizen 
control of the public agenda.12 Effective participation means, "Before a policy is adopted 
by the association, all the members must have equal and effective opportunities for 
making their views known to the other members as to what the policy should be."13 Also, 
every citizen must have an equal opportunity to vote, and, therefore, all the votes must 
count as equal. In order to have a fairly elected leader, the elections must be held 
8 Ibid., 46. 
'Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
1t Ibid., 47. 
12 Ibid., 36. 
13 Ibid., 37. 
8 
impartially, freely, and frequently, permitting citizens to express their preferences and to 
maintain control of the public agenda.14 
Although democracies have flaws, democracy is widely believed to be the best 
form of government. Beyond ensuring equitable elections, democracy regulates conflict, 
provides for legitimate government, and promotes social stability as well.15 By regulating 
conflict, democracy avoids corruption and encourages the government to settle disputes 
through legal process rather than through violence.16 Instead of controlling many aspects 
of people's daily lives, as done by the political system in China, democracy allows its 
citizens to speak freely about their leaders; moreover, the government is inspired to make 
decisions based on the public interest. If elected officials do not respond to public 
interests and needs, they can be removed from office by voters. Policy issues usually are 
debated in the public forum before resolution by the government, which allows the 
people to express their opinions about them.17 By stabilizing the government and 
providing checks and balances, democracy protects its citizens from abusive dictators and 
allows candidates who are running for office to settle their disputes and differences in a 
peaceful manner. 
14 
Ibid., 95. 
15 
Andrew Nathan, Chinese Democracy: Lessons of Failure (Berkley, CA: California University Press, 
1986), 22. 
16 
lbid.,224. 
17 
Ibid. 
9 
China's Failure to Democratize 
The PRC has never had a national legislature elected through direct election by the 
nation's adult citizens, or a strong opposition political party running in an election.18 
Although in 1912 China attempted to establish a democratic republic, for the past century, 
China has failed to move in the direction of democracy, and legislative members have 
been unable to suppress the authority wielded by the party-state. Any movement toward 
democracy was either subjected to severe limits, or marked by corruption.19 In 1912 and 
1913, a parliament was elected, consisting of a Senate elected by provincial assemblies 
and a House elected by all male officials, consisting of about 10.5 percent of the 
population. 20 The parliament was weak and never was permitted to excise its claimed 
power.21 Later in 194 7 and 1948, the national government held elections for the National 
Assembly, Legislative Yuan, and Control Yuan.22 "Once again these elections were never 
completed, nor competitive, due to various reasons, including the wartime conditions and 
the Kuomintang dominance of politics. "23 China did not progress in a direction of 
democratization, because the elections were corrupt, unfair, infrequent, and the political 
groups were unprincipled. At times, the participating voters refused to accept the 
outcomes of elections, and the political actors outside the institutions did not obey the 
laws that were passed by the legislature or respect the legal freedom of the press. 24 In 
present-day China, village elections are led by corrupt leaders, and include nepotism and 
18 Ibid., 22. 
19 
Ibid. 
'0 Ibid. 
21 
Ibid. 
22 
Ibid. 
23 
Ibid. 
24 
Ibid. 
10 
vote buying.25 About 90 percent of village chiefs are Chinese Communist Party members, 
and if a non-party member is elected, the CCP quickly recruits the individual, so that the 
party remains in charge.26 
As the Chinese Communist Party remains in power and the citizens cannot freely 
choose their leaders, corruption undoubtedly will remain widespread in China, as there is 
no permissible political opposition to power holders. Because few persons in China have 
had an appreciation of the fundamental concepts of democracy, throughout history, China 
has failed to establish an elected party that is capable of replacing the authoritarian 
government. 
CCP 's Corruption 
Presently, corruption within the CCP remains a serious problem. Over 97,000 CCP 
officials were disciplined in 2006, and 80 percent of them were found guilty of taking 
bribes or violating financial regulations.27 In March 2007, Zheng Xiaoyu was sentenced 
to death for taking bribes to approve untested medicine. 28 The medicine approved by 
Zheng Xiaoyu killed and harmed many people in China. The former director of the Food 
and Drug Administration took bribes and gifts worth of more than $832,000.29 The 
CCP's corruption and the failure of the Food and Drug Administration to monitor 
compliance to laws have caused the lives of innocent people. In September 2008, the 
tainted milk scandal killed six infants, and sickened 300,000 people in China, other parts 
" Thorton, "Long Time Coming: The Prospect for Democracy in China." 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 "China's Top Drug Regulator Gets Death Sentence," MSNBC, May 29, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn. 
com/id/18911849/ (accessed March 4, 2009). 
29 Ibid. 
1 1  
of Asia, and Africa. 30 Ice bars and yoghurt also have been contaminated with the 
industrial chemical, melamine.31 Milk stations were unregistered and unregulated, and 
have been blamed for watering down milk and adding nitrogen-rich melamine, a 
chemical used in the manufacturing of plastics, which falsified the quality checks for 
appropriate levels of protein. 32 The melamine scandal resulted in the arrests of dozen of 
farmers who were accused of violating the public trust, and of using toxic chemicals to 
save money.33 In January 2009, death sentences were given to three dairy milk producers, 
Zhang Yujun, Geng Jinpin, and Gao Junjie, upon conviction of selling 600 tons of 
melamine-tainted milk to dairy companies. 34 Although the CCP arrested and convicted 
persons who were said to be responsible for the melamine milk scandal, the Chinese 
government failed to regulate the nation's dairy industry that caused deaths and injuries 
not only among the people of China, but abroad as well. Another case, which erupted in 
February 2009 concerning the top milk company in China, Milk Deluxe, revealed 
osteoblast protein, a dangerous substance that can cause various cancerous tumors, in the 
company's product.35 The United Nations and the World Health Organization have 
pressured China to enforce stricter laws on food safety. The government of the United 
States, along with European Union and other governments, including those oflndonesia, 
Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Burundi, Brunei, and Tanzania, 
30 Jane McCartney, "China Launches Crack-Down on Export Mille," Times Online, September 23, 2008, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4807667.ece (accessed March 30, 2009). 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 David Barboza, "Death Sentences in Chinese Mille Case," New York Times, January 22, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/0l/23/world/asia/23mille.html (accessed March 24, 2009). 
34 "Leading Chinese Mille Brand Accused of Causing Cancer," Asia News, February 13, 2009, 
http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=14476&size=A (accessed March 28, 2009). 
35 Ibid. 
12 
banned products made from Chinese-produced milk.36 In recent years, China has 
exported tainted food products with harmful pesticides, chemical fertilizers, and 
antibiotics. Products that China does not monitor kill or injure innocent people. 
Widespread corruption within the one-party government not only blocks democratic 
development, but also violates human rights, domestically and internationally. 
Repudiated Freedom of the Press 
Lack of freedom of the press also inhibits democratic progress in China. The government 
exercises great control over the media through government ownership and censorship.37 
There are various restrictions which the press must follow, and journalists are not allowed 
to travel freely. The government made an exception only from January 2007 into 2008, 
in the run up to and during the Beijing Olympics ( except in Tibet) for foreign and 
mainland journalists to travel and report throughout China.38 Even foreign journalists, 
however, were prohibited from reporting about the anti-government protests in Beijing 
during the Olympics. Since then, Chinese authorities have extended regulations, and 
foreign media must obtain permission from local authorities to enter Tibet. 39 March 10, 
2009, marked the fiftieth anniversary of the failed Tibetan uprising, and provoked many 
demonstrations against China's government. 40 The authoritarian regime advocated strong 
military presence, and high restrictions on the Internet as well as text messaging usage in 
36 "EU Bans Baby Food with Chinese Milk," CNN, September 28, 2009, 
http://cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/09/25/china.milk/index.html (accessed March 23, 2009). 
37 Thorton, "Long Time Coming: The Prospect for Democracy in China." 
38 Ibid. 
39 "China Must Address Press Freedom in Tibet," CPJ, March 9, 2009, http://cpj.org/2009/03/china-must­ 
address-press-freedom-in-tibet.php (accessed April 20, 2009). 
40 "Two Tibetans Arrested Amid Ongoing Media Restrictions," CP J, March I 8, 2009, 
http://cpj.org/2009/03 I two -tibetans -arrested-amid-ongoing-media-restricti.php (accessed April 20, 2009). 
13 
Tibet.41 On March 24, 2009, Google search engine reported that the You Tube video- 
sharing Web site was blocked in China, because supporters of the Dalai Lama had 
broadcast a video that showed the Chinese military brutally kicking and beating Tibetan 
protestors during the March 2008 demonstrations.42 The CCP not only "filters Internet 
content and blocks material that is critical of its policies,',43 but also it imprisons and 
threatens local as well as foreign members of the press who are critics of the regime. 
During the March 2008 riots in Lhasa, the Chinese authorities arrested two local 
filmmakers, Dhondup Wangchen and Jigme Gaytso, for taping interviews and making a 
documentary about the lives of Tibetan residents under Chinese government rule.44 The 
filmmakers were held in prison for seven months, and no family members were ever 
informed of their arrest.45 Another case, which took place in February 2009, involved a 
newspaper reporter, Liu Xu, who was stabbed and threatened by "unknown" persons.46 
Xu's Internet biogs included items censored by the Chinese authorities, such as the 
melamine milk scandal and other incidents involving government corruption.47 Because 
2009 marks the twentieth anniversary of the June 4,1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, as 
well as the tenth anniversary of the April 10,1999 Falun Gong crackdown, the 
government has been on high alert to prevent anti-government demonstrations, and on the 
41 Ibid. 
42 Miguel Heft, "You Tube Blocked in China, Google Says," New York Times, March 24, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/25/technology/intemet/25youtube.html? _r= I &adxnnl= I &adxnnlx= 1240 
373947-/zMRwDjRPA+ IOCXNya3n4Q (accessed April 20, 2009). 
43 Ibid. 
44 "CPJ Condemns China's Detention of Tibetan Filmmakers," CPJ, October 17, 2008, 
http://cpj.org/2008/IO/ cpj-condemns-chinas-detention-of-tibetan-filmmaker.php (accessed April 20, 2009). 
4' Ibid. 
46 Andrew Jacobs, "At Reading in Beijing, Noted Writer Is Stabbed," New York Times, February 15, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/16/world/asia/16china.html (accessed April 20, 2009). 
47 Ibid. 
14 
lookout for any foreign and domestic press that could tarnish the reputation of the 
authoritarian regime. 
Democracy Redefined Chinese-Style 
Democracy has a different meaning to the Chinese than it does to Westerners. China 
experienced complex political changes during the twentieth century, and the concept of 
democracy came to be understood by the Chinese people as the term was manipulated by 
their authoritarian leaders. After 1949, Mao Zedong promoted "social democracy," but 
not Western-style democracy. Social democracy advocated by Mao featured mass 
revolutionary movements directed by mass mobilization.48 Social democracy called for 
"social harmony," that was turned toward the building of powerful government rather 
than toward the promotion of individual rights and a limited government.49 Mao's 
ideology was based on Marxist analysis of social classes and social democracy. so In 
direct contrast to Western-style democracy, Mao promoted class warfare and centralized 
leadership. After Mao's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reform and an 
open-door policy which involved liberalization of government control over people's 
private lives, but he limited social and institutional pluralism in order to boost economic 
growth.51 From social democracy and a command economy, China transitioned to a 
social market economy. In this new economic system, the peasants were to determine 
48 Yijiang Ding, Chinese Democracy after Tiananmen (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia, 
2001), 6. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, and Doh Chull Shin, eds., How East Asians View Democracy (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008), 210. 
51 Ibid. 
15 
how the land would be used.52 This new policy encouraged people to establish their own 
private businesses and attracted foreign investments. After 1978, China opened its doors 
to foreign trade and its economy grew rapidly. 
The open-door policy, along with the prospect for rapid economic growth, 
inspired Chinese students to engage in three pro-democracy movements in 1978-1979, 
1986, and 1989. However, rather than having a clear understanding of and desire for 
democracy, the students were driven simply by outgrowths of the new reforms, and 
sought high-paying jobs after graduating from universities. Since Deng Xiaoping's 
suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen democracy movement and his death in 1997, the 
CCP has remained in tight political control of China. Party members are under the strict 
discipline of China's leadership in Beijing, and the CCP controls government agencies, as 
well as national, provincial, and local legislatures and the courts. 53 Party members also 
dominate life in the villages, and exercise influence in the military, industries, education, 
and journalism; moreover, they censor the Internet. 54 
The majority of people in China assume that their country possesses a democratic 
system. This is because the CCP created a Chinese political system using the term 
"democracy," based on its own interpretation of the term. Since effective participation in 
elections is a main element of democracy, election terminology is used in China as well. 
In China, many citizens vote periodically at a local level, and they might be even more 
involved politically than some Westerners, but they have no influence over the selection 
"Ibid. 
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of officials above the village level, work place, or school. 55 They cannot create or 
contribute money to pressure groups that could challenge the government, or elect a 
leader or change a policy above their given community, work, or educational unit. 
Although this sort of election allows citizens to frequently participate in a limited way in 
local governance, the system is blatantly biased toward continued control by the existing 
political establishment. Not only do the party officials keep a record of participants' 
political attitudes, but also the system allows the leaders in Beijing to maintain total 
political control over China's citizens. The CCP manipulates its people through steady 
propaganda, leading them to believe that China is moving toward democracy. In reality, 
"Chinese democracy involves participation without influence." 56 The concept of 
democracy in China is generally understood in Chinese terms, based on China's cultural 
heritage, and is not influenced by Western standards of democracy. 57 
Is Democracy Possible in China? 
There is no driving force for democracy in China. There has been much speculation that 
the rising middle class would one day become the major force for China's 
democratization. In truth, the middle class in China depends on the CCP for employment 
and resources, and therefore it is not in its interest to oppose the government. The CCP 
provides benefits to the majority of the members of the middle class. As long as 
economic stability is provided, the middle class sees no need to oppose the government. 
The middle-class citizens are, in many cases, entrepreneurs and successful business 
"Ibid. 
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people. In 2004, it was estimated that 20 to 30 percent of them were CCP members, and, 
therefore, they had an impact on matters such as property rights and reform of state- 
owned enterprises (SOEs).58 
In contrast, the working class and the peasants suffer from excessive fees and 
taxes, unfair compensation resulting from confiscation of land on which they dwell by 
local officials, and the venality of law-enforcement officials.59 Riots are often caused by 
peasants and members of the working class who are suppressed by local CCP members, 
as well as by high-level authority figures in Beijing. Most peasants benefit little from the 
market economy and endure many hardships trying to maintain a living. Since 1987, 
elections have been carried out in local villages and townships in an effort to quell social 
unrest. The CCP claims to be moving China toward democracy, but this is a bogus 
assertion, as the village and township elections are closely monitored by state officials. 
Although by means of polling techniques officials in the West are aware of public 
attitudes, surveys are conducted to ensure that candidates and officials are mindful of 
public views, not to root out dissent and punish challengers to the regime. 
On March 2009, Wu Bangguo, the chairman of China's National People's 
Congress, underscored the rejection of Western-style democracy by China's fourth 
generation of communist leadership. He boldly asserted that, "China would never adopt a 
multiparty political system, separation of powers, a bicameral legislature or an 
"Elizabeth Economy, "Don't Break the Engagement," Foreign Affairs (May/ June 2004), 
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independent judiciary.T'" Wu's remarks not only repudiated hope that China would 
liberalize along Western lines, but also claimed that the one-party authoritarian system 
was vastly superior to democracy.61 Wu argued that, "without a single Communist Party 
in control China 'would be torn by strife and incapable of accomplishing anything."' 62 
Wu declared that Western-style democracy is not suited to China, and that the Chinese 
people would not be able to handle a multiparty system. The Chinese understanding of 
democracy is based on "popular support for the powerful government rather than 
individual rights, diverse social interests and limited government. "63 The CCP constantly 
reminds its citizens that Western democracy will not be adopted in China, so that the 
people will accept the one-party system as the only option for China's political future. 
Confucianism and Democracy 
The long history of Confucianism in China also is a big factor in Chinese 
misunderstandings of the basic fundamentals of democracy. Since Confucian ideology is 
based on authority, discipline, limited individual freedom, and the strength of the state, 
"authoritarian regimes restrictive of human rights are looking to an Asian model of 
development based on Confucianism rather than the West."64 In China, the government 
disregards the Western concept of human rights, which was adopted by the United 
Nations, and instead bases its values on Confucian sentiments. Confucian teachings are 
60 Michael Wines, "In China, No Plans to Emulate the West's Way," New York Times, March IO, 2009, 
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not founded on personal individuality or personal property,65 but on the interdependency 
of fathers and elder brothers. 66 "The learning of Confucianism has tended to be 
oppressive and to promote male selfishness. "67 Although Confucianism was vigorously 
attacked during the Mao period, Confucian behavior was characteristic of Mao himself. 
It is fair to assume then, that the middle class in China has derived much of its 
moral outlook from enduring Confucian ethics, and thus depends on the government in 
many ways, including for the provision of jobs and insurance of social stability. The 
Chinese government bases its actions on Confucian hierarchical order as well, in part by 
not giving its people liberal freedoms or a sense of individual rights. On the contrary, it 
controls its citizens by restricting their liberties, and makes great effort to cause the 
people to be dependent on the government. For example, private entrepreneurs need to 
surrender a certain amount of income to local officials, otherwise they cannot obtain bank 
loans. Educated middle-class citizens who are graduating from universities often are not 
able to earn a decent income unless the government places them into jobs. The lack of 
personal property is also derived from Confucianism. illlllllllfAillllliii 
. ' The land is owned by the government. 
There have been many instances when the government has taken away homes and land 
for new construction, and the affected people are given unfair compensation. Although 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by United Nations member 
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countries all over the world, the enduring Confucian attitudes do not support the concepts 
of universal human rights and freedoms; rather, they lean toward authoritarianism.68 
68 
Ibid. 
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Chapter3 
Pro-Democracy Movements in China: 
Call for Political Liberalization or for Fulfillment of Individual Needs? 
Along with Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam, China continues to be ruled as a one-party 
state. Beginning in the late 1970s, student movements grew into the so called "pro­ 
democracy" movement in China. In the 1980s, there were several student demonstrations, 
but none of them called for the Western-style concept of democracy. The Tiananmen 
Square protest movement of 1989 made headlines across the world when the Chinese 
government used military force to suppress this movement, killing hundreds, some say 
thousands, of demonstrators. Persons in the West believed that the students and the 
workers died in the name of democracy. The Western press and many Chinese citizens 
claimed that the events that took place in the spring of 1989 were a step toward 
democracy for China. In truth, the students demanded attention from the government to 
matters that would fulfill their individual needs. 
Why the Students Demonstrated 
Since 1978, China has experienced rapid economic growth. The open-door policy has 
been a route toward national modernization and has provided hope for a better future in 
China. During the forty years prior to 1989, communist rule frequently had condemned 
intellectuals, and now the educated, growing middle class had the opportunity to become 
22 
interested in moral absolutes and political rights.' The students involved in the1989 
demonstrations came from various walks oflife. Some emerged from poverty-stricken 
areas, and some came from prestigious institutions of higher learning in China. All of the 
students had been trained in an educational system that required memorization rather than 
creative thinking and analysis of text material. 2 Most students, if not all, had very little 
experience with Western translations and political ideas. The only newspapers to which 
they had been exposed were those that were channels of government propaganda; works 
of Western-style democracies were strictly forbidden by the CCP. 
In early 1989, the media began reporting that "doctors and university graduates 
earned less than cab drivers, and hairdressers, and that everyone earned less than private 
entrepreneurs." The students felt that they were entitled to a better life, and wanted the 
government to provide benefits to them such as good jobs, travel abroad, and all the other 
privileges that the CCP had to offer. 4 During the 1986-1987 demonstrations, students had 
held banners for freedom and democracy, but when asked to elaborate, they had 
complained about government corruption, uncomfortable dormitories, and poor food.5 
The slogans attacking high-level officials for corruption, calling for a free press and 
advocating democracy and freedom, symbolized an open political process for self-serving 
elite. 6 Students focused on their own individual needs rather than on the common good 
for the whole country. They challenged the government to compromise, to give them 
I Jane McCartney, "The Students: Heroes, Pawns, or Power-Brokers?" in Broken Mirror, ed. George Hicks 
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what they wanted, so they could go back to the classroom and abandon their movement. 7 
Although the demonstrators carried slogans that called for democracy and freedom of the 
press, in reality, they did not demand fundamental change within the government. Instead, 
students wanted change that addressed their personal needs. They were dissatisfied with 
living conditions on campus, and, what seemingly was most important, they wanted a 
guaranteed lifetime job that came with the benefits of being a CCP member. They were 
aware of the competition among the educated elite class, and were terrified of ending up 
with a job that did not live up to their expectations. As rewards for their academic work 
and achievements, the students expected guaranteed government jobs, good housing, and 
privileges that ordinary citizens of China do not have. They held aloft democratic slogans, 
but these terms were aimed at expanding their own rights and opportunities. They were 
not concerned with unfair treatment of peasants or workers, and they did not raise 
concerns about broad abuses by their government of human rights and religious and other 
freedoms. In fact, the students approached their movement in elitist and non-egalitarian 
terms.8 During the protests of 1986-1987 and 1989, the students did not call for the rule 
oflaw. The ideology behind the protests was of the educated elite, of which the students 
were part. The main theme of the demonstrations and their posters "was not that the CCP 
should be more responsive to the ideas of China's masses but rather that it should allow 
the intelligentsia a greater voice in national affairs. "9 During the demonstrations, students 
in Fujian Province were shocked, even horrified, that true popular elections would have 
to include all classes in China, peasants and workers as well as the educated elite. At first, 
7 
McCartney, Students: Heroes, Pawns, or Power-Brokers?" 7. 
8 Esherick and Peny, "Acting out Democracy," 36. 
9 Ibid. 
24 
the students and intellectuals were ambivalent about the lower classes joining their 
movement.l'' The students wanted the government to meet their demands, not those of the 
workers. 
As the movement gained popular support, however, the demonstrators began to 
consider the benefits of increasing the number of people in their movement.11 They 
recruited members of the lower classes to join their demonstrations so that the mass 
movement would be larger, and, therefore, the media, the people, and, most of all, the 
government would take the protests seriously and perhaps negotiate with the students to 
give them what they wanted. However, the students pursued their own individual needs, 
ignoring the plight of the workers. 
The workers could see that participation was being strictly restricted to 
students themselves, as if the workers were not qualified to participate. 
And from the news on television, accusing workers of spreading rumors 
etc., it seemed that workers were being specifically targeted by the 
authorities. They could see the sentences imposed against working-class 
people were particularly heavy. Moreover, in Beijing the issues that the 
students raised had nothing to do with the workers. For example, Wuer 
Kaixi in his speeches only talked about the students [Wuer Kaixi and other 
student representatives' dialogue with Li Peng was broadcast nationwide 
on television]. Ifhe had mentioned the workers as well, appealed to them 
in a sincere manner, the workers might really have come out in a major 
12 way. 
Fuzhou students seemed concerned with their own economic situation. They 
feared a drop in their living standard. They also believed that American teachers were the 
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most highly paid, and that in China teachers made less than peasants.13 These ideas about 
Western standards ofliving and their own relative positions in Chinese society prompted 
the students to protest against government officials. The students believed that they were 
being abused by the one-party state.14 They wanted the government to recognize their 
movement and to understand their frustration. They believed that the government of 
China had let them down. "The solid political career that they believed entry to a 
university guaranteed them had been snatched away."15 Other people who had been 
affected by the corrupt government sided with the students by reading their banners and 
applauding them.16 
The spring 1989 demonstrations by Beijing students encouraged economic reform 
and liberalization.17 The hunger strike by some three thousand students soon gained the 
support of thousands of citizens in China, including workers, who demanded a response 
from the government. First, the government tried to wait out the hunger strike, hoping 
that the students would become bored and return to their classrooms. On May 18, Premier 
Li Peng engaged in limited communication with the students, as he believed that it was 
inappropriate to discuss the students' demands. The following day, Zhao Ziyang, general 
secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, and Li Peng went to Tiananmen Square, 
where Zhao begged the students to end their demonstrations. Failing to get the 
demonstrators to end their protests, on May 20, Li Peng and President Yang Shangkun 
13 
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announced that martial law would be used to end what the China's leaders claimed was 
chaos in Tiananmen Square. What started as a peaceful demonstration by unarmed 
students ended in bloodshed on June 4, when the PLA opened fire on the protestors. The 
Chinese government received detailed documentation on an hourly basis from security 
ministries and foreign and counter intelligences, whose work included gathering 
additional information from the CCP's Propaganda and United Front Work departments, 
State Education Commission, and various cabinet-level ministries.18 The party officials 
had information on the state of mind of the students, workers, farmers, and all others 
around the country.19 These documents were strictly confidential, and the CCP gathered 
them together to make decisions on the situation in Tiananmen Square. 
The use of martial law against the protestors showed to the people of China, as 
well as to foreigners, the ugly nature of the authoritarian regime. If the CCP had voted to 
pursue a dialogue with the students rather than to use military force, relations with the 
West would have been smoother, and there might have been hope for China to lean 
toward democracy at some point. Instead, the West and the people of China were quickly 
reminded of the brutal nature of the Chinese government, and any hope for political 
liberalization faded away quickly. 
Response from the CCP 
The 1989 demonstrations were by students who were angry with their government 
because it did not provide guarantees to them for life. The economic reform in China that 
was proposed by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 had provided an opportunity for China and the 
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West to prosper economically. However, in the 1980s, journalists and economists 
reported many incidents of intellectuals' lacking jobs, and the job market was becoming 
competitive. This meant that the students were not assured positions. The students had 
wanted to discuss conditions with which they were not satisfied. They demanded 
dialogue to urge the government to recognize: "(I) the impact and nature of the student 
movement, (2) ways to strengthen reform, and (3) article 35 of the Constitution, which 
guaranteed freedom of expression, publication, association, and the right to 
demonstrate. "20 The students believed that, despite their effort to initiate talks with 
government officials, it would be unlikely that authorities would meet with them.21 The 
decision of June 4, 1989, to clear the square and end the student movement, showed how 
the Chinese government is very willing to disregard the human and civil rights of its own 
people. Both the students and the CCP "pushed each other's buttons" until the end, so that 
compromise on either side became less and less an option. 
On April 15, 1989, the former secretary general of the CCP, Hu Yaobang, had 
died. Most students had grieved his death in a peaceful manner, respecting and 
acknowledging his former leadership of the party. 22 On April 25, Deng Xiaoping had 
realized the possible consequences of the student demonstrations and concluded that the 
participants were seeking to create chaos within society through an attempt to overthrow 
the Chinese government. 23 Deng then stated, "We must not be afraid of people cursing at 
us, of a bad reputation, or of international reaction. Only if China develops, and 
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implements the four modernizations [of agriculture, industry, science and technology, 
and national defense], can we have a real reputation.t''" The decision makers planned to 
use force against the protesters, if necessary; risk of a bad international image did not 
play a role. Loss of foreign investments was not as important, either, as the possibility of 
the overthrow of the CCP-led government. According to the "Tiananmen Papers," 
presented by Andrew Nathan in Foreign Affairs in the winter of 2001, on April 26, 1989, 
Deng Xiaoping was furious with the uncontrollable students, and was ready to clear the 
mass movement from Tiananmen Square. He complained: 
This is no ordinary student movement. The students have been raising a 
ruckus for ten days now, and we've been tolerant and restrained. But 
things haven't gone our way. A tiny minority is exploiting the students; 
they want to confuse the people and throw the country into chaos. This is a 
well-planned plot whose real aim is to reject the Chinese Communist Party 
and the socialist system at the most fundamental level. We must explain to 
the whole Party and nation that we are facing a most serious political 
struggle. We've got to be explicit and clear in opposing this turmoil.25 
According to Deng Xiaoping, the students were rejecting the Chinese government, and 
were trying to disturb society by turning the people against their own government. He 
wanted to end what he considered to be public chaos, despite the consequences of a loss 
of foreign investment and Chinese authorities' bad international image owed to their 
abuse of human rights. However, Deng and the government officials who sided with him 
wanted to clear Tiananmen Square prior to the arrival of the Soviet Union President 
Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev's visit was intended to highlight Deng's achievements in 
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foreign policy.26 Gorbachev and Deng were supposed to discuss the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from Afghanistan, Soviet support for the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, 
and Sino-Soviet efforts to improve relations between mainland China and Taiwan.27 In 
Deng's eyes, the students had badly disrupted China's meeting with the leader of the 
Soviet Union. Tiananmen Square was inaccessible, therefore, the usual welcoming 
ceremony could not take place in the Forbidden City.28 Foreign media coverage focused 
on the student protesters rather than on the arrival of Gorbachev and China's improved 
relations with the Soviet Union.29 
Following Gorbachev's visit, when further efforts failed to convince the students to 
leave Tiananmen Square, the government imposed martial law to suppress the 
demonstrations.l" Martial law had never been imposed in Beijing before, but to the CCP, 
it seemed like the only solution to end the demonstrations. Two months before, martial 
law had been declared in the Tibetan city, Lhasa, to suppress ethnic riots, leading to 
bloodshed.31 Yet, the protesters at Tiananmen Square underestimated the brutality of the 
CCP leaders and their military force. Prior to June 4, 1989, the students could only 
speculate about the potential costs of demonstrating against the government. 32 What the 
students did not realize, was that their authoritarian government would use military force 
against their mass movement, as it leaders viewed the demonstrations as a threat to the 
communist regime. On the morning of June 2, 1989, party elders Deng Xiaoping, Li 
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Xiannian, Peng Zhen, Yang Shangkun, Bo Yibo, and Wang Zhen met with the Standing 
Committee of the Politburo to discuss the final actions to be taken against the student 
protesters. 33 Some party elders were more passionate about using military force than 
others. During the meeting, Wang Zhen prodded his comrades as follows: 
Those goddamn bastards! Who do they think they are, trampling on sacred 
ground like Tiananmen so long?! They're really asking for it! We should 
send the troops right now to grab those counterrevolutionaries, Comrade 
Xiaoping! What's the People's Liberation Army for, anyway? What are 
martial law troops for? They're not supposed to just sit around and eat! 
They're supposed to grab counterrevolutionaries! We've got to do it or 
we'll never forgive ourselves! We've got to do it or the common people 
will rebel! Anybody who tries to overthrow the Communist Party deserves 
death and no burial! 34 
The Tiananmen Square Crackdown of 1989 
On June 4, 1989, the troops began to move eastward toward Tiananmen Square. At 9:30 
p.m., the People's Liberation Army began to fire tear gas and rubber bullets into the 
crowd.35 The troops fired warning shots, but the crowd failed to respond, showing no 
signs of fear that the military would use live ammunition.36 However, at approximately 
10:30 p.m., the troops opened fue against the protestors. 37 Killings of both the students 
and soldiers continued throughout the night. By 5:40 a.m., Tiananmen Square had been 
cleared, leaving thousands killed or injured. 38 
The exact number of people killed and injured during the massacre is unknown, 
because foreign journalists were not allowed to take pictures or otherwise document 
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events. However, observers said that Beijing looked as though it had been engaged in war, 
with plumes of smoke rising into the air and burned-out military vehicles and buses in 
view. The government took major action on June 4, as it feared that the large crowds of 
student, intellectuals, and workers in Beijing and in other cities might topple the regime. 
"The events of 1989 left the regime positioned for its responses to later challenges, 
such as the Chinese Democratic Party in 1998-99 and the Falun Gong religious 
movement since 1999."39 Since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, the party has 
been harsh on independent groups that it has suspected of opposing the government. Also, 
any mass movement, whether of a religious, student, farmer, or worker group without 
party members as constituents, has been quickly crushed. 
The Chinese government has feared being overthrown by a large mass movement 
because it was witness to what happened in Eastern European countries. In February 
1989, a large mass movement in Poland, with the help of the Catholic Church and Pope 
John Paul II, overthrew the communist regime, and helped Poland to transition into 
democracy. On June 4, 1989, when Chinese authorities cracked down on citizens in 
Tiananmen Square, Poland was holding its first parliamentary elections since the end of 
the Second World War.4° Chinese officials also witnessed General Wojciech Jaruzelski's 
use of martial law against the anti-communist mass movement in Poland.41 The Chinese 
government thought that the protests in Beijing were growing beyond the party's control, 
and therefore used Jaruzelski's tactics to suppress the Tiananmen Square demonstrations 
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before it was too late. 42 After the June 4 massacre in Beijing, the party-controlled 
newspaper observed, "The suppression of students, workers, and citizens, and the 
arbitrary apprehension of political offenders under the martial law would only end in 
acknowledging the people's strength, and conducting dialogues with the people. "43 
China after the Tiananmen Massacre 
After the events of the Tiananmen massacre, the Chinese leaders held no regrets. They 
were convinced that they had done what was necessary to end the demonstrations in 
Tiananmen Square that they were convinced threatened the regime. By imposing martial 
law on May 20 and opening fire against the demonstrators on June 4, the central 
government had given a stem warning to the students and their sympathizers not to repeat 
such protests, as the consequences would be severe. Among Chinese officials, there was a 
deep sense of "We told you so.',44 Chinese leaders justified their actions and placed the 
blame on the students, claiming that if the demonstrators had listened, the crackdown 
would not have taken place. 
There was deep fear among the people of China. The government hunted the 
demonstrators. Many protesters were jailed, and even given death sentences. The people 
of China and around the globe were now keenly aware that the Chinese government was 
willing to suppress any mass movement that was critical ofit. The events of June 4, 1989, 
showed the true colors of the Chinese central government. Neither foreign investments, 
nor the human rights of the Chinese people, nor a bad international image played a role 
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when the eight CCP elders made the decision to use military force against the students. 
Following the crackdown, Deng Xiaoping's economic reform program was challenged by 
conservatives in China, who believed that China's opening to the West had led to 
challenges against the CCP and against the Chinese communist system, in general. 
However, Deng and many other leaders realized that the continued economic 
development of China was the best hope for the party's retention of control of power. 
Economic Development and Political Liberalization in China 
The assumption among Westerners that economic reform in China would lead to political 
liberalization of its government, proved to be false. It also proved erroneous that the 
educated middle class would demand democracy as it accumulated more influence in 
society. Since the Tiananmen Square massacre, continued economic development has not 
Jed to political liberalization; rather, the CCP has suppressed any organization or 
movement that it deems capable of opposing the government. Moreover, the so-called 
democracy movement in China all but vanished after the massacre. The demonstrations 
had not been in support of Western-style democracy, but instead were an effort to 
convince the government that the individual needs of the protestors should be fulfilled. 
As previously noted, the students had a very poor understanding of democracy. Lack of 
jobs was a concern and the demand for secure positions following graduation was a 
significant motivation for the demonstrations. The students did not want to have to 
compete for jobs, nor did they want jobs that would not be commensurate with their 
educational backgrounds. 
34 
In a democratic country, people are allowed to protest if they are not satisfied 
with their government, because each citizen has the right to publicly express an opinion. 
A good government protects its citizens from harm, and does not use military force 
against its people, because it honors the rights and freedoms of individuals, which include 
the freedom and right to express one's views. 
Although the student protesters were not calling for democracy and the end to the 
CCP-led government, the CCP nevertheless used martial law and military force to 
terminate the demonstrations at Tiananmen Square. Thus, regardless of the demands of 
the protesters, the Tiananrnen massacre showed the absence of tolerance among top 
authorities in China for confrontation regarding their rule. Following June 4, 1989, the 
educated middle class has focused its attention on the accumulation of wealth and shown 
no inclination to be a catalyst to move China toward democracy. Not only do members of 
the middle class have a vague understanding of Western-style democracy, but also there 
is no apparent desire or solidarity among them that would erupt in a political challenge to 
the one-party state. Every group since 1989 that has engaged in protest has done so in 
concern for its own interests, and there has been no consolidation of their efforts for the 
purpose of establishing a democracy. 
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Chapter4 
The Rising Middle Class: 
China's Hope for Democratization, or Agent for Preserving the Political Status Quo? 
Since Deng Xiaoping's 1978 open-door reforms, new social groups have emerged in 
China to form an emerging middle class. This arising middle class includes people in 
occupations and professions resulting from the open-door policy and China's rapid 
economic growth. The middle class embraces contract-based managers of state 
enterprises, professors, senior scientists, stock brokers, real-estate agents, senior 
employees in major banks and other financial institutions, managers of private and 
foreign companies, lawyers, singers, athletes, fashion models, designers, and others.1 It 
also includes scientific and technical development entrepreneurs, the Chinese 
management staff of foreign enterprises located in China, the middle and senior 
management staff of state-owned financial enterprises, and some owners of private 
enterprises. 2 
The past decade has seen the rise of something Mao sought to stamp out 
forever: a Chinese middle class now estimated to number between 100 
million and 150 million people. Though definitions vary-household 
income of at least $10,000 a year is one standard-middle-class families 
tend to own an apartment and a car, to eat out and take vacations, and to 
be familiar with foreign brands and ideas. They owe their well-being to 
the government's economic policies. 3 
I David S.G. Goodman, ed., The New Rich in China: Future Rulers, Present Lives (New York: Routledge 
Taylor and Francis Group, 2008), 1 .  
2 "Five Kinds of People Seen as Middle Class of China," China Business Daily News, February 11,  2003, 
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3 Lisa T. Chang, "China's Middle Class," National Geographic, May 2008, http://ngm.nationalgeographic. 
com/2008/05/china/middle-class/leslie-chang-text.html (accessed March 4, 2009). 
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The Middle Class and the CCP 
Life is good for an average middle-class family in China. Many own cars, housing, and 
have a decent income to maintain a high living standard. According to Xinhua News, in 
2007, an estimated 6.15 percent of China's population, which is about 80 million, were 
making about 60,000 to 500,000 yuan as an annual income. In urban areas, an average 
person made 11,759 yuan, in contrast to rural citizens whose yearly average income was 
3,587 yuan.4 The wealthy in China are regarded as the middle class, which differentiates 
them from the middle class in the Western world. Today, China's wealthy middle class is 
estimated to be about 8 percent of the entire population. 5 
Since China is one of the largest economic powers in the world, there has been 
speculation that modernization in China and the rising middle class might follow Western 
footsteps toward forcing democratization, and that the wealth of the middle class might 
be the key to China's political stability. For decades, however, China has failed to 
liberalize politically and its modernization has weakened the Chinese people's desire to 
resist the authoritarian government. Presently, the Chinese government provides state 
employment for the state functionaries and professionals. According to David Goodman, 
a professor at the University of Sydney, the "Chinese middle class is largely the creature, 
though not wholly intentionally, of the ruling communist party rather than the fruit of an 
upwelling of economic autonomy or free thinking.i" 
4 Ibid. 
5 
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In Western countries, the middle class was created by the process of 
industrialization and derived its income from services and management that it provided. 7 
The middle class produced managerial and professional occupations, which were not 
controlled by the state. As industrialization deepened, the state became more complex, 
creating more jobs and stabilizing society. 8 Unlike Western societies in which the middle 
class emerged, China's middle class keeps a close relationship with the Communist 
Party.9 Goodman says, "Where new entrepreneurs did not already participate formally in 
the activities of the party-state, particularly at leadership levels, they have now found 
themselves fully incorporated; and many new entrepreneurs would appear to depend on 
family networks of influence grounded in the party-state." 10 
The middle class in China builds networks of family influence, so that when 
members retire, their children can take over the business, "building on the local 
relationships and networks of influence that their parents have developed.t''! The private 
entrepreneurs are associated with social, economic, and political influence in China. As 
their business grows and they wish to expand their production or take a bank loan, a 
private entrepreneur must give part of his equity to the local government, otherwise he 
will not be allowed to build his businesses or take a loan.12 Without a close relationship 
to the government, private entrepreneurs would not be able to run or increase their 
businesses enterprises. They are dependent on the government to become wealthier, and 
7 Rowan Callick, "Myth of China's New Middle Class," The Australian, January 18, 2008, 
http://www.theaustralian.news.corn.au/story/0,25197,23046185-21147,00.html (accessed March I, 2009). 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Goodman, The Nf!W Rich in China: Future Rulers. Present Lives, 17. 
II Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 30. 
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to build a network of influence that will help them to increase their income. The private 
entrepreneurs' initiative promotes individual economic growth as well as wealth for 
China.13 Industrialization and economic development among the middle class has not 
ensured liberal democracy in China, however; rather, it has promoted government 
corruption and economic wealth within the self-serving middle class. 
As private entrepreneurs are becoming wealthy with the help of the CCP-led 
government, the peasants in the countryside are faced with fees, taxes, and takeovers of 
land with unfair compensation.14 These factors often cause the peasants and the urban 
workers to protest and riot. Although the peasants and workers are frustrated with unfair 
treatment by the Chinese government, often they feel powerless against the CCP. 
Members of the middle class do not oppose the CCP, however, as long as they are 
guaranteed employment and the government satisfies their individual needs. The living 
standards of the middle class continue to improve, and its members usually can afford 
luxuries, including plasma TVs, washing machines, and other items that most Westerners 
can enjoy. Middle-class citizens usually hold steady jobs that have been guaranteed by 
the government. If they are CCP members, the government provides housing and other 
benefits to them. 
l3 Ibid. 
14 
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The Non-Privileged Class 
In 2009, it is estimated that more than 80 million peasants live in poverty, and most of 
them earn less than $100 per year.15 As noted, conditions in China's rural areas are more 
harsh than in urban centers. Oppressive taxes cause disputes in local villages. From the 
1980s through the present, the Chinese government has forced various taxes on villagers, 
such as education taxes, taxes for marriage and burial, and taxes for sterilization or 
having a baby. 16 At times, the taxes have been simply described as land fees or poll 
taxes.17 Local officials also tax the peasants for delivering letters and for electricity and 
water conservancy.18 If the peasants are unable to pay these taxes, their belongings are 
being taken away from them. 
The widening gap between the rich and the poor increasingly has caused the 
peasants to rebel against the government's corruption. In 1998 and 1999, peasant riots 
occurred in Hunan Province. In Qiyang County, the police opened fire on I 0,000 people 
who protested in front of the Chinese government's headquarters.19 Another 
demonstration by local farmers in Daolin led police to use a tear gas canister, resulting in 
one death and the injury of about a hundred farmers." The local group known as the 
Society for Reducing Taxes and Saving the Nation organized the protest in Daolin, and 
its leaders were arrested. In the same year, about a hundred farmers from Guoyuan 
15 Rebecca McKinnon, "China's Reform Produces Winners but More Losers," CNN Online, 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/china.50/asian.superpower/middle.class/ ( accessed March 4, 2009). 
16 Jasper Becker, The Chinese (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 44. 
17 lbid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 lbid. 
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village in Jiangsu Province protested against high taxes. 21 Given the strong-willed nature 
of the CCP, the government used police force, and about thirty peasants were injured and 
ten were taken into custody. Riots also took place in Qidong, Wenfushi, Dazhongqiao, 
Luodi, Xingqi, Xupu, and Xizhang.22 
In many cases, it is China's dysfunctional taxation system that has caused 
peasants to rebel. In Zizhou Province, 12,688 farmers filed a law suit against local 
officials for collecting 25 percent of their annual income and beating the farmers who 
were unable to pay the taxes due to drought or crop failure. 23 The court found the fees to 
be unfair, but no action was taken against the corrupt officials. Indeed, the taxes collected 
from the peasants frequently are used to pay government employees' salaries and 
bonuses.24 In 2002, the annual fees collected from the peasants were estimated at I .I 
billion yuan, which averages to 100 yuan per peasant." In 2004, it was estimated that in 
Liaoning Province, each peasant had to pay 43.5 percent of his annual income to the CCP 
government. 26 Yet, in China, the law states that each household should contribute no 
more than 5 percent of its income for taxes. Additional imposed fees include private 
political projects and other mandates for higher government officials. 
The protests have been increasing in China since the 1990s. "The nation saw 
87,000 'public disturbances' in 2005, a euphemism for riots and uprisings.v'" Since the 
21 Peter Symonds, "Protests of Workers and Farmers: Social Tensions Rise in China," January 22, 1999, 
http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/janl999/chin-j22.shtml (accessed February 8, 2009). 
22 Becker, The Chinese, 46. 
23 Symonds, "Protests of Workers and Farmers: Social Tensions Rise in China." 
24 Becker, The Chinese. 44. 
25 Ibid., 148. 
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1998 and 1999 demonstrations in Hunan Province, where thousands of peasants 
demonstrated and left many injured, the CCP has not improved living standards or unfair 
taxation in the rural areas. In March 2007, twenty thousand farmers in Hunan Province 
clashed with one thousand police armed with guns, protesting against the government's 
corruption and unfair taxation that leaves them to struggle to provide basic needs for 
themselves and their families.28 
The economic reform efforts begun by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 have improved the 
standard ofliving in China, in general, owed to a GDP growth rate of IO.I percent 
between 1981 and 1990, and 11 .6 percent from 1991 through 1995.29 However, the 
reforms also changed China's industrial structure. State-owned enterprises have declined, 
and private, foreign, and collective investments have grown tremendously. In 2000, 70 
million peasants moved from villages to the urban areas and found long-term jobs in 
state-owned enterprises. 30 In the same year, the estimated total number of workers in 
China was about 350 million.31 Between 1998 and 2002, however, 27 million people 
were laid off from state-owned enterprises. 32 The situation was tense and created riots. 
There were many incidents such as the one April 1999, in the northeastern city of Fushun, 
when 4,000 unpaid workers blocked the railroad, disrupting the service.33 It was 
28 "20,000 Farmers Riot in China over Widening Gap between Rich and Poor," Mail Online, March 12, 
2007, http://www.dailymail.co.uVnews/article-441748/20-000-farmers-riot-China-widening-gap-rich-poor­ 
html (accessed March 28, 2009). 
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(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 127. 
30 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 144. 
31 Ibid. 
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estimated that about 3 million workers were involved in protests that year.34 Workers not 
only were losing jobs but also retirement pensions and medical benefits were being taken 
away. In Anhui Province, ten thousand workers protested due to the lack of medical 
insurance and injury compensation.35 Due to the economic recession of2008-2009, more 
workers in China have protested as a result of diminished compensation and layoffs. In 
December 2008, hundreds of workers gathered outside a Shanghai electrical components 
factory to demand reasonable pay and working conditions.36 Of approximately 130 
million migrant workers in China, the recent global economic turndown has led over 20 
million migrant workers to lose their jobs. 37 
By the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, rural and urban lands were owned 
the government sells the land to developers for new construction projects and forces 
villagers to evacuate. People then have to depend on the compensation that is given to 
them by the government. Compensation is usually unreasonably low, and people who 
have built these houses themselves through hard work, must leave. Forced takeovers of 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 "China Factory Workers Protest," Strait Times, December 9, 2008, http://straitstimes.com 
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land by the government caused about 800,000 demonstrations across mainland China in 
2005.40 In that same year, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences reported that 40 
million farmers had lost their land, and the number was increasing by 2 million 
annually.41 The land where farmers once grew rice and vegetables is being converted into 
urban constructions sites. In 2001, in the Wuhu district on Chengdu's west side, the local 
government offered farmers compensation for their homes and fields.42 They were 
offered $2,200 for one-sixth of an acre, an amount equal to what people pay for fifty 
square feet in a new apartment. Many villagers refused to take the compensation, so the 
government cut off their water and electricity, and then damaged their property.43 Many 
villagers refuse to leave their homes, and protested to the authorities in Beijing. On 
September 17, 2007, the villagers from the Wuhu district were imprisoned, beaten, and 
forced to admit that they had broken the law. 44 
Although villagers are victims of forced land takeovers, and workers are losing 
medical and retirement benefits, when workers and the farmers protest against unfair 
treatment, the protests are not to overthrow the CCP, or to demand democracy. Once 
again, protests lodged against China's officials are based on the government's not 
meeting individual needs. 
40 Wu Zhong," A Step toward the Rule of Law," Asia Times, April 18, 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes 
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The Failure of the Middle Class to Prompt Political Liberalization 
Former President Bill Clinton believed in China's ability to politically liberalize and to 
create government stability through globalization. In his 2000 speech at Vietnam 
National University in Hanoi, he stated, "Globalization is not something we can hold off 
or turn off. It is the economic equivalent of a force of nature like wind or water. ,,4s Like 
many, Bill Clinton believed that positive aspects of globalization would lead the Chinese 
government toward political liberalization. 
Since 1978, trade between the West and China has permitted China to grow 
militarily and economically, in part by allowing it to industrialize extensively. However, 
China's role in globalization has not promoted domestic political stability in the PRC, nor 
has the emerging middle class guaranteed steps toward Western-style democracy. In fact, 
through economic reform, the Chinese government has been able to exploit China's 
population, exposing laborers to harsh working conditions and paying them unfair 
wages.46 Many observers of China have speculated that appreciation of human rights and 
political liberalization might arise in the PRC when the educated middle class became 
politically informed and put their high salaries to good use.47 Optimists held that Chinese 
children would gain a good education and better jobs, become better citizens, and gain 
rights as well as the freedom to organize themselves to challenge the authoritarian 
government and turn China into a democracy.48 According to statistics in 2009, however, 
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the growth of the middle class is not as rapid as predicted in the 1990s, when the growth 
rate of the economy in China was at its highest peak. 
The 2008-2009 global economic crisis is having a profound effect in China. It is 
estimated in 2009 that about 20 million Chinese migrant workers are returning to their 
home villages, because millions of factory positions have been eliminated. 49 "The crisis 
puts in peril the government's efforts to lift hundreds of millions of peasants out of 
poverty and to close the staggering gap between the country's urban rich and rural 
poor."50 Since many workers are left jobless, and independent trade unions are banned in 
China, many workers have resorted to rioting. Uneducated workers have no skills and 
cannot explore other career options. They cannot turn to their government for help, and 
out of desperation they organize mass movements.51 So far, these demonstrations have 
been quickly brought under the government's control, and have not exhibited the 
characteristics of a democracy movement. 
Economic Crisis 2008-2009 and the Impact on China 
The current economic crisis has created serious financial concerns. "It is not long ago that 
China was introducing measures to cool down an economy that grew by 11.9% last year. 
But that figure fell to just 9% in the third quarter of this year [2008] due to a slowing of 
export and investment growth."52 The Chinese government has given companies a 
49 Mark Mackinnon, "Jobless, Restless China: 20 Million and Growing," February 20, 2009, 
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$958bn stimulus package to avoid further economic slowdown.53 Despite the bailout 
money, factories still are closing and workers have unified to demonstrate against the 
massive layoffs caused by the global crisis. As these workers are often uneducated and 
unskilled, many accept poor labor conditions, minimal rights, and unfair payroll 
compensation. All they want from the government is to get their jobs back, so that they 
can support their families. 
Since the West has been hit with the economic crisis, its publics cannot afford to 
buy products from China at previous levels. Consequently, in November 2008 it was 
reported that, the wages of workers in Guangdong province have been cut by II 
1111.54 Nonetheless, the Chinese government is not as worried about the massive 
layoffs of blue-collar workers as they are of the white-collar middle class. The middle 
class in China consists of some I 00 to 150 million citizens who are accustomed to having 
more choices and a higher standard of living than the average Chinese: 
For China's emerging middle class, this is an age of aspiration-but also a 
time of anxiety. Opportunities have multiplied, but each one brings 
pressure to take part and not lose out, and every acquisition seems to come 
ready-wrapped in disappointment that it isn't something newer and better. 
An apartment that was renovated a few years ago looks dated; a mobile 
phone without a video camera and color screen is an embarrassment. 
Classes in colloquial English are fashionable among Shanghai 
schoolchildren, but everything costs money. 55 
The Chinese government is aware that China's middle class wants to maintain a 
certain living standard, and the memory of the 1989 protests reminds it that its very 
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survival may be based on keeping the middle class happy. China's officials fear that 
increasing unemployment might lead to another eruption of social instability, which 
could be hard to control. 56 To avoid social turmoil, the Chinese government now provides 
unemployment benefits and social security wages to the middle class. 57 If the Chinese 
economy starts to crumble, however, jobs would become more scarce and the standard of 
living among members of the middle class could decrease tremendously. Especially since 
the global economic downturn, there have been massive lay-offs from state-owned 
enterprises, compounding the previous hardships of the loss of medical health benefits 
and retirement pensions. 58 
There is little on which to base speculation that the emerging middle class will 
lead China toward political stability, and, eventually, democracy. Although the current 
economic crisis could lead to middle-class discontent, and once again, the middle class 
might unfurl slogans of democracy and freedom, its basic demands would likely be for 
financial stability and fulfillment of its consumer expectations. The middle class seeks 
money and government benefits rather than basic fundamental changes to the one-party 
system. Given the I 00 to 150 million people who are in the middle class, their deep 
dissatisfaction could be problematic for the central government. Yet, there is no 
indication that this stratum of society wants to overturn the CCP-led authoritarian state. 
The middle class is in a far better position than the workers who have lost jobs and are 
forced to return to their rural areas. Indeed, the government is still most concerned with 
members of middle class, giving them unemployment and retirement benefits to avoid 
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unrest. If the middle class were to organize demonstrations, it likely would be to demand 
that the government meet their own needs. They would seek freedom for themselves and 
protest against government corruption, as during the 1989 protests, while their 
understanding of Western-style democracy remained very vague. The citizens of China 
along with the Chinese government "define democracy in its own terms, drawing ideas of 
good government with deep roots in the nation's historical culture and more recent roots 
in its ideology of socialism.r'" It is not likely that the middle class would care that the 
workers are in a far worse situation due to the economic crisis, or about abuse of the 
human rights of other citizen of China practiced by the government. "The educated elite 
view the rest of the population as illiterate, backward, and superstitious." 60 
As evidenced by the cruel nature of its actions in the 1989 crackdown, however, 
the central government fears that the emerging middle class will lodge protests against it 
if their expected living standards are not achieved. That is why state officials are doing 
whatever they can to keep the middle class happy, and trying to keep its members away 
from the political arena. 
Reluctant to cut loose all state enterprises to market competition and 
create a huge new wave of unemployment, the government instead has set 
strict production and price controls. It is throwing money into new job­ 
creating infrastructure projects and is taking measures-like lowering 
interest rates-to encourage people to spend their money.61 
The government is looking out for members of the middle class during the global 
crisis, by providing unemployment benefits to them and by cutting interest rates so that 
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they will spend more money and be able to maintain a high living standard. It is creating 
new jobs, in part by building new infrastructure projects which often take away land from 
the farmers. Premier Wen Jiaobao said that he" hoped to create nine million new jobs in 
the cities and increase local government spending budgets by almost 25%."62 The 
government stimulus package to create new jobs is especially aimed at satisfying the 
middle class, for "when people cannot get jobs they may start to question why the 
Communist Party should stay in power. "63 
Status and Power of the Middle Class 
The nature of the Chinese government is to do what it takes to maintain control of the 
state and to stay in power. The government's focus, as noted, is on investment in new 
companies to create jobs for the middle class. Premier Wen and the Communist Party 
strongly believe that projects to build new infrastructure will help the economy, create 
political stability, and avoid social turmoil. "In China, a developing country with a 
population of 1.3 billion, maintaining a certain growth rate for the economy is essential 
for expanding employment for urban and rural residents, increasing people's incomes and 
ensuring social stability."64 Only a portion of the stimulus bill will be used for 
construction of railways and roads, which might create temporary jobs for the lower class. 
China's middle class, or zhong chan, is a strong force that could have a significant 
impact on China's politics, and society as a whole. It is not an ordinary middle class, 
however, as viewed in the West. China historically viewed itself very selfishly as the 
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"middle kingdom," ignoring other societies as grossly inferior. Similarly, today the 
middle class views itself as superior and more deserving than the lower classes of 
Chinese society. Edward Friedman asserts that the Chinese government "would reject 
democracy as an alien plot that would empower China's lesser-quality people of the 
center, thereby splitting the nation and ending its rapid rise. "65 Given the fact that the 
middle class views itself elite, the Chinese government cannot afford to lose its support, 
especially because, "based on an annual growth of one percentage point, the 'middle 
class' people in China are expected to make up 40 per cent of the total population in 
2020."66 If the government were to fail to provide a high living standard to the middle 
class, the legitimacy of the CCP-led government would be badly eroded. This concern 
helps to explain why stores featuring luxury brands such as Gucci, Christian Dior, and 
Chanel have begun to appear in more and more Chinese cities. The average middle class 
in the West cannot afford to buy designer brands which cost thousands of dollars. In 
China, the middle class is well-off compared to most of China's society, and until the 
global economic downturn, the number of its members kept growing. Focus on its own 
comforts, the middle class has no interest in demanding broad civil and political rights for 
all social classes, because it benefits from the existing political system. The government 
sides with the middle class, because it is the source if continued economic growth which 
is essential to the CCP's ability to cling to power. Thus, the middle class and the CCP 
have common interests. The CCP provides the middle class with wealth and benefits, and 
the middle class in return, does not oppose the government. 
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Chapters 
China's Lack of Religious Freedom: Reasons behind the Crackdowns 
Religious freedom is an important dimension of Western-style democracy. The freedom 
to worship in one's religion became internationally accepted through the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations in 1948. Article 18 
declares, 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. 
China, one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, 
endorsed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by agreeing to the final declaration 
ofit at the World Conference of Human Rights in 1993.1 Although China has nominally 
agreed to honor the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it brazenly violates the 
international Declaration on religious freedom. 
The Chinese government suppresses and harasses any religious or belief group 
that could pose a threat to the ruling power. Places of worship must be registered, and the 
Chinese government controls religious practices, restricting the growth and activity of 
religious groups, and overseeing the appointment of clergy.2 There are only five 
sanctioned religions in China: Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Protestantism, and 
Catholicism.3 For each faith, there is a government-controlled association to monitor its 
I 
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religious activities.4 These associations are overseen by State Administration of Religious 
Affairs.5 
Article 36 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China promises 
"freedom of religious belief," but in reality, severely restricts religious freedom and 
denies protection of basic rights that are upheld in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. The Chinese Constitution leans toward Confucian practices that promote state 
interference. Based on article 36, the state can interfere in religious activities that it 
defines as abnormal, meaning that it can suppress any group or organization that it claims 
to be disruptive to the social order of the state. Article 36 states that, 
Citizens of People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. 
No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to 
believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate 
against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. 
The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of 
religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health 
of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state. 
Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign 
d 
. . 6 
omination. 
Thus, owed to qualifying language, the citizens of China are not allowed to practice their 
religion freely. The Chinese government allows its citizens to practice their religious 
beliefs behind closed doors or in a state-approved venue. They are not permitted to freely 
proselytize their beliefs, however, and in many cases, the government spreads false 
propaganda against religious groups that it deems could threaten the authoritarian regime. 
Unlike in democratic societies, an atheistic state determines what are "normal" religious 
4 Ibid. 
5 Richard Madsen, "Saints and the State: Religious Evolution and Problems in Governance of China," in 
China's Development Miracle, ed. Alvin Y. So (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 253. 
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activities and suppresses those that it declares to be "abnormal." Thus the one-party 
system violates the basic fundamentals of article 22 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights which declares, 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. 7 
Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, based on Western-style 
concepts of democracy, allows people to practice their religion or belief freely in both 
public and private places. Although the Chinese government assures its citizens that basic 
religious freedoms as well as human rights are protected in the Chinese Constitution, 
when comparing article 36 of the PRC Constitution to article 22 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, it is clear to see that the Chinese government distorts the 
intent of basic freedoms. In practice, China seeks consensus on human rights based on 
Chinese authoritarian perspectives. 
The CCP historically has been on guard to prevent religious groups from rising 
outside the authority of the government and preaching against its ideology, policies, and 
practices. The demand for freedom to practice one's beliefs often causes confrontation 
between spiritual believers and the authoritarian government. For example, the Fulan 
Gong movement was banned in July 1999, and designated as an evil cult. 8 The state 
officials claimed that the Falun Gong (also known as the Falun Dafa) disturbed society, 
and that it was harmful to the physical and mental well-being of people. 9 Presumably in 
response to the rising influence of Falun Gong, on October 3 1 ,  1999, under article 300 of 
7 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
8 Yiu Wong, One Country, Two Systems in Crisis (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004), 78. 
9 Maria Hsia Chang, Falun Gong: The End of Days (Orwigsburg, PA: Yale University Press, 2004), 99. 
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China's Criminal Law, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
banned all unregistered religions. 10 
Persecution of the Falun Gong 
Falun Gong is mainly an exercise group which involves breathing, and is believed to 
inherit the wisdom of Buddhism, Taoism, and traditional Chinese qigong.'! In 2008, it 
was estimated that the number of Falun Gong practitioners in mainland China was about 
70 million, which was about the same number of the CCP party members.12 Since 
members do not consider Falun Gong a religion (knowing that there are only five 
religions that are sanctioned by the government) and it has no designated places of 
worship, it has been difficult for the government to supervise this group of believers. 
The Falun Gong consists of members from various walks of life: peasants, middle 
class professionals, professors, and even government workers. Rich and poor have been 
members of the Falun Gong. The purpose of the movement was not to overthrow the 
government, but principally to teach breathing exercises to promote good health. Many 
people joined, however, not only to gain health benefits but also because they were 
intrigued by Falun Gong's mysterious cosmology. Falun Gong is based on three simple 
principles: truthfulness, benevolence, and tolerance.l ' These principles attracted many 
who, in groups, practiced their stylized exercises in public park-like places. 
10 Barbara Larkin, International Religious Freedom (2000), 96. 
II Yiu Chung Wong, One Country, Two Systems in Crisis, 79. 
12 Nishka Patel, "Ahead of Olympics, Beijing Crackdown Extends to Falun Gong Followers," World 
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In the past, Christianity, among religious groups, received the greatest restrictions 
by the CCP.14 However, in 1999, the government became greatly concerned with non- 
Western belief groups, such as the Falun Gong, that were derived from Buddhism and 
Taoism. The members of these groups often face harassment, physical abuse, and 
frequently prison.15 None of the arrests has been connected with violence or actual threats 
against society. Simply seeking legalization, the Falun Gong had demonstrated at 
Tiananmen Square and in other public places.16 The only "crimes" that the Falun Gong 
had committed were that they practiced their beliefs outside government control, and 
sought legalization of their practices. Not only did the government accuse the Falun Gong 
of being an evil cult, however, but also it spread anti-Falun Gong propaganda throughout 
the Chinese media. China's newspaper, People's Daily, a mouthpiece for the government, 
and the Chinese Academy of Social Science accused Falun Gong's leader, Li Hongzhi, of 
accumulating wealth and brainwashing his followers. Since the CCP controls the media, 
police, security personnel, and the National People's Congress, it is easy for it to spread 
propaganda and to arrest groups that it perceives oppose the state government. The news 
media publishes false information about the Falun Gong, while the judicial system 
justifies or hides crimes that the CCP commits against the leaders and followers of the 
group.17 Many of the arrested followers of the Falun Gong have been sent to prisons or 
labor camps without trial.18 "At the same time, the diplomatic system has spread lies in 
the international community and enticed foreign governments, state officials and 
14 Ibid. 
IS Ibid. 
16 David Aikman, Jesus in Beijing (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing 2003), 237. 
17 Epoch Times, Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party (Mountain View, CA: Epoch Times, 2004), 
137. 
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international media with political and economic incentives so that they will remain silent 
regarding the issue of the prosecution of the Falun Gong."19 
However, the foreign press has reported the persecution of the Falun Gong in 
China. Among these journalists, Ian Johnson of the Wall Street Journal won a Pulitzer 
Prize in 2001 for his extraordinary work on the Falun Gong. He is known for covering 
individual stories of Falun Gong members, reporting the torture and deaths, and 
describing the cruel crackdown of the CCP against this organization. Johnson compares 
the April 1999 crackdown on the Falun Gong to the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, 
stating that "it left countless scars below the surface of society, and has become another 
marker on China's painful path to modernization. "20 Besides torture and deaths, many 
Chinese citizens are forced to split from their families, and move away from their homes 
with the fear of arrest. 21 Johnson reveals to his readers the false propaganda spread by the 
Chinese media against the Falun Gong members, and the hidden reality behind the 
crackdowns. "In a country of 1.3 billion, most are ignorant and many accept the state-run 
media's explanation that Falun Dafa is a dangerous cult, a mind-controlling organization 
that must be crushed at all costs to preserve stability."22 
By 2000, it was estimated that 5,000 members of the Falun Gong had been sent to 
the re-educated labor camps without trial.23 To prove that the Falun Gong was unhealthy 
to the mental stability of its members, the CCP sent many practitioners to psychiatric 
19 Ibid. 
20 
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Wall Street Journal. December 26, 2000, A21. 
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hospitals, making their families responsible for all living and medical expenses. 24 
Amnesty International reported that lawyers were prevented from entering pleas of not 
guilty, and, according to the International Human Rights Organization, they had to obtain 
permission from the CCP to represent Falun Gong prisoners. 25 
In 2002, the Department of State's report on religious freedom stated that several 
hundred practitioners of the Falun Gong had died while in prison and in labor camps 
since 1999.26 "In early March [2008], the U.S.-based Falun Dafa Information Center 
announced that 1,878 practitioners from 29 provinces had been arrested since January 
2008 and that cash rewards ofup to $360 were being offered by the government to 
identify members."27 Although the Chinese government claims that China is governed by 
the rule oflaw, the unjust treatment of Falun Gong believers is clear evidence to the 
contrary. 
Although the Falun Gong demanded to be recognized as a legal entity, which led 
to the April 1999 crackdown, there have been no demonstrations by members of Falun 
Gong or their supporters to overthrow the government. The April 1999 demonstration 
demanded freedom and civil rights for Falun Gong members. Although religious 
freedom is essential to democracy, the demonstrations held by the Falun Gong were not a 
call for broad-based religious freedom in China, however. The main reason for the 1999 
demonstration was for tolerance of the group: the leaders and their followers wanted 
nothing else but the freedom to practice their own beliefs in public places. What 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Aikman, Jesus in Beijing, 237. 
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provoked the Falun Gong to demonstrate was the anti-Falun Gong propaganda that the 
Chinese government spread, in part by planting defamatory articles in Chinese 
newspapers. The members of the group responded by organizing sit-in demonstrations in 
front of government buildings. Intense demonstrations by the Falun Gong began when 
the CCP banned the group, and sent followers to prison and labor camps. Westerners, 
such as scholars at the Brookings Institution, inclined to explain the demonstrations of 
China's dissidents in democratic terms, interpreted the protests as being "on behalf of 
tens and thousands of innocent people who suffer imprisonment, torture or even death at 
the hands of their own government in China."28 
Victimization of Sanctioned Religions 
Falun Gong is not the only faith-based group that the Chinese government controls and 
persecutes. Many religious groups in China resist the government's control and operate 
outside the official boundaries. 29 The response of the Chinese government to religious 
groups has been mixed. House churches that operate in small villages and are not 
spreading into other regions are not usually targeted by state officials.30 Repression is 
used by the Chinese government when it lacks the ability to control religious groups that 
spread rapidly and are also linked with other movements.31 Religious freedom is 
frequently abused in the ethnic minority regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. Resistance to the 
government's control erupted again in March 2008 among Tibetan Buddhists who follow 
28 
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the Dalai Lama, and martial law was unofficially imposed in the region in March 2009. 
Muslims in Xinjiang, too, are prosecuted and refuse to practice their beliefs in registered 
places of worship. Still, Henan, Anhui, and Shandong provinces have faced the broadest 
religious persecution. Religionists in major urban centers are not excluded from 
persecution, however, as arrests of leaders and members of unauthorized religious groups 
are common in big cities such as Beijing, to prevent belief systems from spreading 
rapidly. Christian underground churches, whether in urban or rural settings, are an 
especially significant challenge to Chinese government officials, because authorities 
cannot easily control them. They are constantly subject to government crackdown. As 
religionists of any persuasion cannot publicly proclaim and spread their faiths, religious 
persecution of Christians, Tibetan Buddhists, and Muslims, in particular, is one of the 
most troublesome abuses of human rights in China. 
Victimization of Church Leaders 
Since the early 1990s, Amnesty International has reported that many church leaders, 
including in Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Hebei provinces, have been detained.32 In 2001, Gong 
Shengliang, a head of the South China Church, was sentenced to death, and severely 
tortured and beaten in prison.33 The Chinese government accused Gong of"establishing a 
cult organization in the South China Christianity, raping women and violating social 
order."34 As with Falun Gong, the Chinese government spread accusations and 
condemning information through the media, and called the South China Church an evil 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America, " Chinese Embassy 
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cult. The harsh treatment of Gong was part of a crackdown on the South China Church. 
Gong was accused of raping six females, but the alleged victims released letters on 
January 29, 2002, stating that they had been tortured by the state police and coerced into 
providing false testimony against Gong.35 The women had been beaten severely with 
electric cords, until they implicated the church leader. 36 According to China Daily in 
February 2003, Ye Xiaowen, director of the State Administration of Religious Affairs, 
stated that "no one in the country is allowed to use religious affairs as an excuse to 
undermine public order or damage the physical or mental health of other citizens. "37 
There was no indication whether there was an investigation or a court appeal for Gong.38 
However, there was intimation that the police received extra bonuses from the 
government for the number of arrests and convictions of the South China Church 
members.39 
Tibetan Buddhists 
Since 1951, when the Chinese exercised full control of Tibet, the region has been a 
source oftension.40 After the 1959 Tibetan uprising against China's authoritarian regime, 
the spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, fled to India in exile. During the late 1980s, China 
declared martial Jaw and violently suppressed Tibetans, killing hundreds of protestors. 
The clashes in Lhasa during the 1980s were by far the largest. In the light of the March 
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2008 and March 2009 crackdowns, the Dalai Lama fears that the CCP-led government 
will continue to violently persecute the Tibetans. 41 
In 1995, government officials in Tibetan began campaigns to "reeducate" all 
monks and nuns to be patriotic and to adopt socialist ideologies. 42 According to the 
United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees, three thousand Tibetans entered Nepal 
to escape the reeducation campaigns. "In February 1996, Chinese leaders ordered the 
closure of politically active monasteries and required the replacement of all monastic 
leaders. "43 The reeducation campaigns started in three major monasteries, Sera, Drepung, 
and Ganden, and reached fifty other monasteries and nunneries by June 1997 .44 "By 
September 1997 more than 900 of 1, 700 monasteries had been reached with 30,000 of 
46,000 monks and nuns affected."45 Those who resisted the reeducation campaigns and 
did not denounce the Dalai Lama were imprisoned, tortured, and accused of political 
activism. 46 The patriotic or reeducation campaigns were aimed at gaining control over the 
Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and establishment. The one-party state does not take into 
consideration international reaction from Western countries. The main objective of the 
CCP is to suppress any mass movement that might advocate a high degree of regional 
autonomy or separation from China, or act as a counter-witness to the government. 
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Although the Chinese government asserts that the people of mainland China have 
religious freedom, no religious group is exempt from government repression. In early 
2009, it was estimated that there were approximately 6 million Tibetan Buddhists in 
China.47 However, the exact number cannot be known, because many Tibetan Buddhists 
refuse to practice their religion under the control of the Chinese government. In February 
2009, against government directives, they refused to participate in public ceremonies 
celebrating Losar, the Tibetan New Year, and customarily avoid registering with the one- 
party state. 
State officials claim that Tibetan Buddhists have a right to freedom of religious 
expression. However, they are not allowed to post pictures of the Dalai Lama in public 
places, or anything that would advocate Tibetan independence or any form of 
separatism. 48The Chinese government maintains that the Dalai Lama is the leader of an 
"exile government," and a "criminal" who is on a mission to separate China.49 In a recent 
article in China Daily, the government accused the Dalai Lama of trying restore a 
theocracy in Tibet, and by doing so, of violating the Chinese Constitution and misleading 
the public. The Memorandum on Genuine Anatomy of the Tibetan People was presented 
by the Envoys of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to the Chinese officials on November 4, 
2008, in Beijing, in an effort to find common ground between the Tibetans and the 
Chinese people.l" The Memorandum did not seek Tibet's separation or independence, but 
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instead called for respect of the integrity of the Tibetan people, which is compatible with 
the principles of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. Tibetan Buddhists 
want Chinese officials to allow them to practice their religion freely. A section of the 
Memorandum states the following: 
Religion is fundamental to Tibetans and Buddhism is closely linked to 
their identity. We recognize the importance of separation of church and 
state, but this should not affect the freedom and practice of believers. It is 
impossible for Tibetans to imagine personal or community freedom 
without the freedom of belief, conscience and religion. The Constitution 
recognizes the importance of religion and protects the right to profess it. 
Article 36 guarantees all citizens the right to the freedom of religious 
belief. No one can compel another to believe in or not to believe in any 
religion. Discrimination on the basis ofreligion is forbidden.51 
However Chinese officials firmly believe that "religious activities, which might 
affect other people, must be bound by law."52 Tibetan Buddhists are suppressed despite 
their peaceful attempts to seek common ground with the Chinese government. Since the 
Tibetan Buddhists riots of March 2008, Tibetans have been targets of harsh treatment by 
the Chinese government. In January 2009, the government enforced strict security in 
Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, fearing demonstrations on the fiftieth anniversary of the Tibet 
Uprising of March 10, 1959.53 The police raided thousands of homes and businesses, ran 
checks on 5,766 people, and arrested eighty-one as possible suspects.54 The government 
claimed that strict police enforcement was used to target "criminal activity such as 
burglary, prostitution and theft and is needed to uphold the city's social order."55 In truth, 
the motive behind this campaign was to target suspected supporters of Tibetan 
51 Ibid. 
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independence, and to warn other Tibetans of the possible consequences. On March 10, 
2009, the Dalai Lama said that, "Chinese rule in Tibet has created a 'hell on earth' that 
has caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands ofTibetans."56 Local officials forbade 
foreign press from entering many areas of Tibet, and some foreign journalists were 
detained; also, Internet services, along with text messages, were unplugged to prevent 
people from organizing demonstrations. 57 
Before the Summer Olympics in 2008 in Beijing, the Chinese government played 
a major role in the crackdown on the protestors in Tibet. On March 14, 2008, Chinese 
forces surrounded three monasteries outside Lhasa, after hundreds of Tibetan Buddhist 
protestors took to the streets against the rule of the communist regime. 58 Tibetan 
protesters raised their human rights complaints and their desire for an independent Tibet, 
to test the government officials to see if military force would be used against them. 59 The 
Chinese government ordered tight security, and made the protestors aware of the harsh 
punishments for demonstrating against party officials in Beijing. Reports of the protests 
in Tibet were censored in the Chinese news media, and it was only after international 
pressure that foreign reporters were allowed to enter Tibet shortly after the 
demonstrations. Therefore, it is difficult to determine the number of protesters who were 
arrested, injured, or killed. However, it is estimated that five to six hundred Tibetan 
Buddhist monks were arrested and tortured in prison. Before the Summer Olympics, 
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China faced heightened criticism from the international arena about abuse of the human 
rights of Tibetan Buddhists and religionists of other areas in China. However, the 
government claims that it acts constitutionally according to article 36 of China's 
Constitution, which states that, "No one may make use of religion to engage in activities 
that disrupt the public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational 
system of the state."60 Thus, when the state forces monks and nuns to be reeducated in 
patriotic campaigns, or incarcerates them, it can claim that these religionists have violated 
public order by means of their demonstrations, and, consequently, are deserving of 
punishment. 
The Uighur Minority in Xinjiang 
In the case ofXinjiang, many Muslims are persecuted and often accused of terrorist acts. 
The CCP uses the September 1 1  terrorist attacks as a rationale to crackdown on Muslims. 
The Uighurs enjoyed brief independence in the 1940s, in what was known as Republic of 
East Turkistan. Since then, there have been numerous protests by the people ofXinjiang 
to urge separation from the People's Republic ofChina.61 "People from the Uighur 
community are very much at risk of being arrested, detained, tortured or sentenced to 
labour camps for anything the government equates to separatist feelings, or for holding 
religious activities."62 Despite China's Constitution that promises "freedom of religious 
belief," state officials organize campaigns to marginalize Muslims in their own society. 
Muslim minorities protested in significant number in Tiananmen Square in 1989. 
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Rather than carrying signs of democracy and freedom, the religious demonstrators, in 
general, held up banners reading, "Respect China's Freedom and Religion," and "Uphold 
the Constitution.',63 Muslim protestors reached about three thousand, including Muslim 
students. 64 Unlike the Muslim students, older Muslim males wore white hats, and the 
women wore head coverings to identify themselves as a Muslim minority. Most Muslim 
demonstrators were students, however, who were offended by a book that was published 
by the Chinese government, entitled Sexual Custome.65 The book denigrated the Muslim 
religion because it implied that Muslims practiced homosexuality and sodomy. 66 The 
Muslims' response to the book in 1989 led to many demonstrations, including by the 
three thousand protestors in Beijing on May 12, some twenty thousand already having 
marched in the capital of Gansu at the end of April. 67 Approximately ten thousand also 
demonstrated in the capital of Qinghai and in numerous other smaller protests in Urumqi, 
Shanghai, Inner Mongolia, Wuhan, and Yunnan. 68 
Democratization in Protestant and Catholic Countries 
Protestant countries developed rapidly in terms of their economies during the period of 
Western industrialization. The Protestant work ethic is thought to have contributed to the 
general well-being and economic advancement of these countries. 69 The Protestant 
countries were also the first to democratize. The founding fathers of the United States 
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promoted liberal democracy based on freedom of choice, temperance, and democratic 
accountability, all rooted in their Protestant beliefs.70 In the case ofNew England, 
Protestant domination resulted in parliamentary democracy. The United States, United 
Kingdom, Holland, and Switzerland were Reformed Protestant countries that avoided 
authoritarian leaders and adopted democracy. 71 Protestant characteristics are solidly 
rooted in the promotion of individual rights and self-reliance. 
Catholic countries also became democracies, but not until the 1970s, as they had 
a history of authoritarian leadership that was supported by the indigenous hierarchical 
Roman Catholic Church. The Second Vatican Ecumenical Council opened under Pope 
John XXIII in 1962 and ended under Pope Paul VI in 1965. (The First Vatican Council 
was adjourned in 1870, and never met again; five popes reigned before the Second 
Vatican Council was proclaimed by Pope John XXIII.) Pope John XXIII aimed to 
reform the Church from within. Following the Council in the 1970s, Pope John Paul II 
and the Holy See became more concerned with the struggle against authoritarianism and 
with the promotion of human rights.72 John Paul II identified the Roman Catholic Church 
as the "guardian to freedom which is the condition and basis for the human person's true 
dignity."73 Major processes of democratization began in Catholic countries such as 
Poland, Brazil, the Philippines, Argentina, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Haiti, 
Chile, and Paraguay. 74 Poland, a dominantly Catholic country, overcame communism 
with the help of Pope John Paul II. With the assistance of Poland's Catholic Church, he 
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organized opposition to the communist regime through the support of the Solidarnosc 
(Soliditary) movement. 75 
Lack of Unity and Determination 
But unlike Poland, or any other small country that became a democracy through the help 
of its Christian churches, China is a large nation consisting of many different religions 
and sects. Although there are large numbers of Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, Tibetan 
Buddhists, and other believers, there is no mass organization, such as Solidarity, to 
challenge the government, or to promote elections of new leaders. It seems that each 
individual religious group demonstrates for its own cause rather than for the common 
good of everyone. The Tibetan Buddhists protest for their own human and religious rights, 
the Falun Gong demonstrated for its official sanction and against false propaganda in the 
media, and the Muslims in Xinjiang are resentful of being portrayed as terrorists by 
government officials, while seeking greater autonomy. There is no mass organization in 
China, however, that aims to challenge the government's control of power. If a religious 
group develops rapidly and is well organized, the government quickly suppresses its 
members and imprisons its leaders. 
If the people of China want to pursue freedom practices, they must do so under 
the government's rule, and there can be no political agenda. Because of the variety of 
people in China and the massive number of problems that face the country, there is a 
constant threat of social instability. This is so especially in regions with ethnic minorities, 
but also in rural areas where there is widespread poverty, as well as widespread 
"David Marquand and Ronald L. Nettler, Religion and Democracy (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2000), 90. 
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underground religious practice. The CCP controls religious movements, however, and 
even if Protestants or Catholics organized a demonstration to demand religious freedom, 
other citizens of China likely would not join it. Because China is not unified religiously 
and there are many religious groups pressing for their own separate causes, to date, 
religious organizations do not appear to be incubators of democracy. Moreover, many 
Chinese do not practice any religion, and are seemingly satisfied with the government. 
Since the government distorts the concept of democracy, many citizens believe 
that, indeed, democracy exists in China. Many rights exist on paper, as shown in article 
36 of the Constitution. But if the CCP believes that religionists are disruptive to society, 
and in many cases this is the government's claim, it simply jails them without a trial. In 
the eyes of most middle-class citizens who have jobs and apartments owed to China's 
economic growth, however, they see nothing wrong with the government of China. On 
the contrary, they are very satisfied with it because the CCP has provided an environment 
in which they can fulfill their personal wants and needs. Thus, there is no outrage 
expressed by China's influential middle class over religious persecution. 
Although there have been international pressures on China to play a positive role 
in protecting human rights, the economic crisis of 2008-2009 has prioritized the agenda. 
During her March 2009 trip to China, Hillary Clinton announced that human rights 
matters would not be at the top of her planned discussions with Chinese officials.76 As the 
United States is in the vanguard of promoting Western-style democracy, the Secretary of 
State should indeed retain human rights at the top of the American foreign policy agenda. 
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However, as shown by administration policies since Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong's 
Shanghai Communique of 1972, Washington's policies toward China have never 
changed human rights practices in the PRC. Fixing the economic crisis will not help 
protect human rights, nor will it increase freedoms in the PRC. Instead, economy 
recovery will help China's central government officials to recruit more CCP members, 
expand China's military, and gain more control over religious and other groups that are 
perceived to pose a threat to the government. 
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Chapter6 
Abusive Activities of the Chinese Government Abroad: 
How China's Foreign Relations Promote Dictatorship and Terrorism 
The Chinese government not only abuses human rights domestically, but also 
internationally. China has allied itself with third-world regimes, and does business with a 
number of them that are notorious for abuse of human rights. Its leaders claim that their 
activities in Africa and Latin America are purely economic and have no political 
dimension. In truth, China's interest in gaining access to oil reserves plays an important 
political role in countries such as Sudan, Iran, and Venezuela. As Sudan, Iran, and 
Venezuela are its main oil partners, China not only makes investments in these countries 
that abet dictatorship and terrorism, but also its foreign policy practices in these countries 
exacerbate violations of universal human and civil rights norms, to the vigorous objection 
of democratic developed nations. Groups in Darfur continue to suffer grave abuses of 
their human rights, and the evolved dictatorship in Venezuela has effectively abolished 
democracy. Thus, China confronted an awkward public-relations dilemma in the run-up 
to the August 2008 Olympics in Beijing, labeled the "Genocide Olympics" by some 
critics of China's leadership. China's refusal, in collaboration with Russia, to support 
United Nations Security Council sanctions against the military junta in Myanmar that 
cracked down on pro-democracy demonstrations in September 2007, further dulled its 
already tarnished international image, stemming from its activities in Sudan and 
Venezuela. 
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that the Sudanese government will be able to collect as much as $30 billion in 2012, and 
much more if countries such as China continue to invest in the country's oil production. 4 
Since 2003, over two million people have died or become refugees in Darfur, and 
the killing still continues. 5 
In the case of Darfur, (PHR) Physicians for Human Rights Record has 
concluded that there is ample indication that an organized campaign on the 
part of the Government of Sudan is underway, targeting several million 
non-Arab Darfurian inhabitants for removal from this region of the 
country, either by death (most common through immediate violence or 
slow starvation) or forced migration. GoS forces allied with the Janjaweed 
militia, have caused intense disruption and destruction for non-Arab 
Darfurian holdings, communities, families, and all means oflivehood and 
necessities. By destroying, stealing or preventing the access to food, water 
and medicine, the GoS and the Janjaweed are creating conditions destined 
to destroy the non-Arab Darfurians. 6 
China's oil investment in Sudan is funding terrorism, and Chinese officials do not take 
into consideration human rights violated in Darfur. In the run-up to the 2008 Olympics, 
the Chinese government suggested that it would pressure the Sudanese government to 
moderate its actions, as international condemnation of Chinese policies in Sudan mounted. 
However, little progress has been noted in the region. 
China's Thirst for Oil in Sudan 
China's rapid global development depends on greater access to more resources than it has 
domestically; with its large population and rapid economic expansion, China is in need of 
natural gas and oil. In the early 1990s, it was predicted that, by 2000, China might 
4 Students Taking Action Now, "Genocide in Darfur: Actions on Companies Doing Business in Sudan." 
5 Goodman, "China and Sudan: Partners in Oil-and Warfare?" 
6 Leonard S. Rubenstein, "PHR Calls for Intervention to Save Lives in Sudan: Field Team Compiles 
Indicators of Genocide," Physicians for Human Rights Record 17, no. I (Summer 2004), 
http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/about/record/pd£'summer04 _record.pdf (accessed October 28, 2007). 
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experience a shortfall of about fifty million tons of crude oil, or about one-third of its oil 
needs.7 On December 6, 1996, China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) gained the 
largest share, 40 percent, of Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), 
which is the largest oil operation in Sudan. 8 In 1998, China Petroleum Engineering & 
Construction Cooperation (CPECC) participated in the construction of a pipeline, which 
was the largest Chinese project abroad.9 "CNPC had received revenue of more than U.S. 
$600 million from the GNPOC concession since exports began in September 1999, and 
Sudan accounted for two-thirds of CNPC's overseas production in 2000. CNPC's 
dependence on Sudanese crude oil continued to expand, importing 2.69 million tons from 
Sudan in January to June 2001, up 38 percent from the year before."10 According to the 
Washington Post, in 2004, Sudan's oil reserves were 563 million barrels, double what 
they had been in 2001.11 In 2007, it was estimated that China was buying two-thirds of 
Sudan's oil.12 Despite the genocide in Darfur, energy-hungry China continues to invest in 
Sudan's oil, blatantly ignoring human rights abuses by the Sudanese government. 
China's Activities in Venezuela 
China also invests in Venezuela, which has a very poor record on human rights. 
Agreements between Venezuela and China involve construction of railroads and the 
improvement of communications in Venezuela through the purchase of satellite 
7 Human Rights Watch, "China's Involvement in Sudan: Arms and Oil,"http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ 
sudanl 103/26.htm (accessed October 25, 2007). 
8 Ashlid Kolas, "China in African Oil: Guilty as Charged?" Economists for Peace and Security, 
http://www.epsusa.org/publications/newsletter/june2007/kolas.htm (accessed October 13, 2007). 
9 Human Rights Watch, "China's Involvement in Sudan: Anns and Oil." 
IO Ibid. 
II Peter S. Goodman, "China Invests Heavily in Sudan's Oil Industry: Beijing Supplies Arms Used on 
Villagers," Washington Post, December 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/ A2 l 143- 
2004Dec22 _ 2.html (accessed October 11 ,  2007). 
12 Ibid. 
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capability from China. In 2005, Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong visited 
Venezuela. Both countries signed a long-term agreement, securing China's stake in 
Venezuela's oil and gas fields. The Chinese invested U.S. $350 billion in fifteen oil fields 
in Eastern Venezuela. 13 In March 2007, Venezuela and China signed an agreement 
permitting China to export from Venezuela 500,000 barrels of oil per day. In September 
2007, the Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and CNPC signed a petition to form a joint 
venture company. Venezuela will own 60 percent of the oil, and China will control 40 
percent.14 During the economic downturn of 2008-2009, China has been cutting deals 
around the globe for gas and oil. In January 2009, China sold Venezuela a $400 million 
satellite, eighteen military jet aircraft, and a radar defense system.15 In return, China buys 
a per-diem average of 338,000 barrels of oil from Venezuela, and it is speculated that it 
will import 1 million barrels a day by 2010.16 In February 2009, Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chavez and Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping signed an agreement increasing the 
fund from $ 4 billion to $12 billion for oil development." 
Friendly Relations between China and Venezuela 
Venezuela's and China's support for each other also became visible when Venezuela 
"voted for China's no action motion against the anti-China proposals put forward by the 
13 Daniel Erikson, "Cuba, China, Venezuela: New Developments," Latin American Network, 
http://lanic.utexas.edu/ project/asce/pdfs/volumel5/pdfs/erikson.pdf (accessed October 29, 2007). 
14 "Venezuelan PDVSA, Chinese CPNC Sign $10 Bin Petroleum Deal," Latin America News Digest, 
http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/nav03.cfm?nav03""65303&nav02=58460&nav01 =57272 
(accessed October 24, 2007). 
"Chris Kraul, "Venezuela Deepens Trade, Military Ties with China," Los Angeles Times, January 12, 
2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/12/world/fg-venezuela-chinal2 (accessed March 31, 2009). 
16 Ibid. 
17 Eric Watkins, "China, Venezuela Bolster 'Strategic Funds' for Development," Oil & Gas Journal, 
February 20, 2009, http://www.ogj.com/display _article/353984/120/ARTCL/none/Exp!D/l/China,­ 
Venezuela-bolster-(accessed March 31, 2009). 
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United States, at the 55th, 56th, and 57th sessions of the UN Human Rights Committee 
(HRC)." 18 Russia, along with Sudan and other underdeveloped countries characterized 
by extensive human rights violations, faithfully voted in favor of China. The United 
States, Canada, Japan, and almost all European countries voted against China. The 
proposal by the United States at the UN General Assembly against China's Human 
Rights violations failed. China's foreign investments in, and strong ties to, Venezuela and 
the China-influenced African bloc has helped Venezuela to prevail in its human rights 
violations. During the 55th, 5611\ and the 57th Human Rights sessions, Venezuela strongly 
supported China's entrance into the World Trade Organization in 200 I.19 Since China's 
economy had been rapidly growing, it was in President Chavez's interest to support his 
ally. 
Military Supply 
In 2006, President Bush banned sales of weapons to Venezuela. Hugo Chavez responded 
by saying, "It doesn't matter to us. It doesn't matter at all."20 It really does not matter, 
because China has been selling weapons to Venezuela. In 2005, China signed a contract 
with the Venezuelan government to supply three JVL-1-type radar systems.21 The 
contract also included the provision of a complete command and control system, spare 
parts, training, technical assistance, and the lease of a communication satellite, all for the 
18 Ministry ofForeign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Venezuela," http://www.finprc.gov.cn 
/eng/w jb/zzjg/ldmzs/gjlb/3538/default.htm (accessed October 15, 2007). 
19 Ibid. 
20 "US Bans Weapons Sales to Venezuela," MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12801930/ (accessed 
October 13, 2007). 
21 Loro Horta, "China on the March in Latin America," Asian Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/ 
atimes/China/IF28Ad0 I.html (accessed October 28, 2007). 
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modest price of U.S. $150 million.22 On February 17, 2009, Hugo Chavez was "re- 
elected" as the President of Venezuela. "The victory came about because of Chavez's 
gross misuse of government funds, government workers and federal facilities for the 
campaign, and neighborhood enforcers to 'persuade' voters to support him."23 Chavez 
imposed a referendum, in which he eliminated term limits for the president's term, and he 
plans to stay in power until 2049.24 Since Chavez controls Venezuela's Congress, the 
Supreme Court, and the National Electoral Council, which supervises elections, he was 
able to manipulate the elections so that the people voted in his favor. 25 
China and Iran 
China's relationship with Iran also poses a threat to democratic free nations. The strong 
partnership in crude oil between China and Iran threatens the ability of the United States 
and its allies to pressure Iran on its nuclear program. China imported more than 40 
percent oflran's crude oil in 2004. With China's growing population and economic 
development, it is aggressively trying to secure its future oil supply. Consistent with its 
claims in Sudan, China maintains that its ties with Iran are purely economic, and have no 
political implications. In 2004, Chinese officials began their effort to build oil fields in 
Iran, which would allow them to export oil directly to China. 26 Also, they signed a 
22Ibid. 
23 "Hugo Chavez's Staying in Power," Los Angeles Times. February 17, 2009, http://www.Iatimes.com 
/news/opinion /editorials/la-ed-venezuelal 7-2009febl 7 ,07705825.story ( accessed March 31, 2009). 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Peter S. Goodman, "China Rushes Toward Oil Pact with Iran," Washington Post, February 18, 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/17 I AR2006021702 I 46.html ( accessed 
February 7, 2009). 
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contract with Iran to buy 250 million tons of natural gas over the next thirty years. 27 By 
signing this contract, Iran became obligated to export 150,000 barrels of crude oil per day 
over the term of the contract. 28 Records show that China imported 225 million barrels of 
crude oil in 2003, 13 percent ofit from Iran alone.29 From 2006 to 2007, China's imports 
oflranian crude oil rose by 14 percent." In March 2009, China invested U.S.$ 3.2 
billion in Iran's two gas production lines, which will produce about U.S. $10.5 million 
annually in natural gas.31The close relationship between China and Iran worries the 
United States and other democratic countries in the United Nations Security Council. 
China's oil relationship with Iran led to the Chinese delegation's veto of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1737 to impose sanctions on Iran to pressure it to end its nuclear 
program.32 Resolution 1737 was proposed on July 31 ,  2006, and called for Iranian 
"suspension of suspect activities. "33 
China's supply of advanced military capability to Iran concerns Western nations. 
After the terrorist attack on September 1 1 ,  2001, the United States government took 
action to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan and other radical Islamists in the Middle-East 
region. Since Iran borders Iraq and Afghanistan, Sino-Iranian relations are relevant to the 
outcome of the wars in the region. China's cooperation is needed to fight terrorism. By 
27 "China to Develop Iran Oil Field," BBC News, November I, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/business/ 
397 0855.stm (accessed February 15, 2009). 
28 "China, Iran Sign Biggest Oil & Gas Deal," China Daily, October 31, 2004, http://www.chinadaily. 
com.en /english/doc/2004-10/3 l/content_387140.htm (accessed March 30, 2009). 
29 "China to Develop Iran Oil Field," BBC News, November I, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business 
/39708 55.stm (accessed February 15, 2009). 
30 Martin Walker, "Iran's Oil Weapon," Space Daily, June 13, 2007, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports 
/Iran_ Oil_ Weapon _999 .html (accessed February 17, 2009). 
31 Lionel Laurent, "Sanctions Keep Lid on Iran-China Deal," Forbes, March 16, 2009, http://www.forbes. 
com/2009/03/16/iran-china-gazprom-markets-equity-gas.html (accessed April 2, 2009). 
32 United Nations, "Security Council," http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm (accessed 
April 4, 2009). 
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supplying Iran with military material, China is supporting the Taliban, as these weapons 
are turning up in the hands of Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. 34 
Despite numerous appeals, the United States charges that China continues to 
supply weaponry to Iran. Weapons of mass destruction, including missile programs from 
China, end up in Pakistan and Afghanistan, now the world's chief area of terrorist activity. 
After the terrorist attacks on September 1 1 ,  2001, the United States government imposed 
sixty sanctions on China for its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile 
sales to Iran. In 2004, China pledged that it would not export any weapons to a country 
that did not honor the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.35 In 
September 2007, ten tons of Chinese weaponry were discovered in Herat, one of the 
Afghanistan's provinces.36 The United States continues to be concerned about China's 
supplying Iran with lethal military capability, despite many sanctions, bans, and warnings. 
Sponsoring Dictatorship and Terrorism 
The genocide in Darfur continues, meanwhile, the Chinese government writes off 
Sudan's debt and gives more aid to the country, which is not used to promote peace but to 
supply the government in Khartoum with more military capability. China plays no 
positive role in Darfur. It does not want to acknowledge responsibility for sponsoring acts 
of dictatorship and terrorism, whether in Sudan or Venezuela. There is a very close 
correlation among China's support for the governments of Sudan, Iran, and Venezuela. 
34 Ron Synovitz, "Afghanistan: U.S. Worried Iran Sending Chinese Weapons to Taliban," Radio Free 
Europe, September 14, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/09/817530bc-0297-4034-8826- 
ac7fff633 l bf.html (accessed February 28, 2009). 
""U.S. Catches China Transferring WMD Tech to Iran," World Tribune, March 15, 2005, 
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/05/breaking2453445 .0395833333 .html ( accessed F ebruary 5, 
2009). 
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The governments are China's leading partners in oil investment. The Bush 
Administration banned oil investments in Sudan, stopped military sales to Venezuela, and 
placed sanctions on Iran for its development of nuclear warfare capability. These 
governments engage in torture and disregard the value of human life. China sides with 
Sudan, Iran, and Venezuela, ignoring any negative image this partiality creates among 
democratic nations. The disapproval of the United States and other Western countries 
does not effectively influence China's foreign policy. Events such as the Tiananrnen 
massacre and the crackdown in Tibet in 2008 and in 2009 remind us that the Chinese 
government does not have high regard for human and civil rights within its own country, 
so, therefore, there is little reason to expect that it will care about abuse of them 
elsewhere. 
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Conclusion 
There have been many theories about whether China will democratize or remain an 
authoritarian regime. The most popular speculation as to why China might modernize 
concerns the pressures on the government for political liberalization brought to bear by a 
rising educated middle class. Because large numbers of Chinese students since the 1980s 
have traveled to the United States and other Western democracies, many scholars and 
politicians have speculated that these students would return to China with Western ideas, 
and create a mass movement to somehow rid the nation of its authoritarian government. 
In this thesis, however, such expectation has been shown to lack merit. The educated 
middle class in China has little understanding of Western-style democracy, and it has not 
been broadly exposed to Western literature and philosophical thought. Under communist 
leadership, students have not been taught the fundamental abstract concepts ofWestern­ 
style democracy. The student protests in the 1980s used slogans of democracy and 
freedom, but the demonstrators' true focus was fulfillment of their individual needs, 
including jobs, housing, and other benefits from the CCP-led government. They did not 
promote human rights in Tibet or elsewhere in China, nor did they mention unfair 
taxation of China's peasants. They did complain about government corruption, 
interpreted in part as the officials' not planning to place students in positions that they 
thought they deserved. The students were terrified and outraged that the government did 
not respond to their needs. In their demonstrations, they did not cry out for democracy; 
rather, they demanded better lives for themselves. In fact, at the beginning of the 1989 
protests, the students did not want the workers to join their demonstrations because they 
felt that the elite class (of which they considered themselves a part) should demand their 
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own individual rights. Not until later, did the students invite the workers' support in order 
to create a bigger mass to pressure the government to respond. The Chinese government 
viewed the demonstrators as undermining its power, and the students did not anticipate 
the severe consequences. 
Since the Tiananmen Square crackdown, the government has continued to suppress 
peasant, worker, religious, and other demonstrations. The CCP keeps tight control of 
religious groups, monitoring places of worship and the growing memberships of religious 
organizations. Any religious group that attempts to worship freely beyond government 
control is quickly suppressed by party officials. The Chinese government has been 
particularly harsh on Tibetan Buddhists, Muslim minorities, underground Christians, and 
Falun Gong. 
The Tiananmen Square crackdown and constant persecution of religious groups have 
created an unfavorable international image for China. But despite pressures from Western 
democratic countries on the Chinese government to embrace political liberalization, it 
continues to violate the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which it 
is suppose to honor. 
Throughout its history, China has remained a repressive and undemocratic country. 
Owed to its building economic and military power, China now poses a potential threat to 
democratic countries around the world. Its political repression, religious persecution, 
proliferation of nuclear technology and weapons of mass destruction, and unfair trade 
practices make it difficult for the Chinese government to legitimately defend its actions 
and persuade other countries that it is moving toward democracy. Despite the rise of 
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China's educated middle class, there has been no fundamental change within the CCP 
government to take steps toward power sharing. The Chinese government continues to 
resist political liberalization, and its top priority is to prevent any weakening of the party. 
It could "continue cautious political reforms that will enhance the state's ability to 
manage the challenges created by China's rapid economic development,"! but such 
political reforms are apt to be cosmetic and unlikely to lead to power sharing or to a 
Western notion of democracy. 
Since the 1978 reform efforts of Deng Xiaoping, China has developed 
economically and militarily, but has remained a Leninist state politically. The Chinese 
government ignores international pressures for political reform, and despite many 
scholars having speculated that the rising educated middle class-exposed to Western 
ideas-would prompt liberal political changes and perhaps even a desire among 
influential people to challenge the government, the middle class still lacks a fundamental 
appreciation of Western-style democracy. Ongoing demonstrations and riots reveal that 
there is tenuous political stability in the country, which political liberalization could help 
to abate. China's approach to human and civil rights goes back to Confucian ethical 
norms, in which individualism and self-fulfillment were discouraged. On the contrary, 
Confucianism promoted dependence, preservation of the status quo, and state control, 
which fostered authoritarianism, and, thus, common ground with China's four 
generations of communist leadership. 
I Pei, "Is China Democratizing?: Ignorance and Reality." 
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China consistently violates many provisions of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. For years, the Chinese government has claimed that, under the Chinese 
Constitution, every citizen has freedom of religious belief, and thus the ability to worship 
in one's own religion. In truth, China has repressed any religious that group has appeared 
organized outside government control or that has been perceived to have the potential to 
be a counter-witness against the government. The loopholes deliberately embedded in 
China's Constitution, such as those in article 36 on freedom ofreligious belief, tell us that 
state officials distort Western democratic understandings and the norms embraced by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in order to secure the option to suppress China's 
citizens. 
The Chinese government represents to its citizens that China is sharing in the 
democratic experience. Yet, village elections that are supposed to be a manifestation of 
China's movement toward political liberalization are controlled by the government, and 
voters' political attitudes are not permitted to counter the policies and practices of state 
officials. The government controls the media, and the foreign press is not permitted to 
report about major protests and government crackdowns, such as those in Tiananmen 
Square in 1989, and in Tibet in March 2008 and March 2009. In 1989, the government 
cut satellite links to prevent events from being covered internationally, and in March 
2009, foreign reporters were banned from much of Tibet so that the realities about the 
undeclared martial law that had been imposed would not be revealed. 
In light of continued state repression, the critical question to answer is whether 
the middle class will demand democracy in China in the near future. The likelihood is 
that it will not. There is no sense of unity between the middle classes and lower classes of 
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China, and the middle class is concerned with its own priorities rather than with the needs 
of the whole country. The Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 support this hypothesis. In 
the eyes of people in the international arena, the educated middle-class students who 
protested in Beijing in 1989, had open minds to Western ideas and protested for 
democracy. In reality, these students, not exposed to Western philosophical works, had 
little understanding of what democracy really is. They used slogans of democracy and 
freedom, but did the students really want democracy, or were they worried foremost 
about their personal needs? 
The 1978 reforms of Deng Xiaoping's second generation ofCCP leadership led to 
rapid economic growth and job competition among the educated middle class. Uncertain 
about their futures, the students came from their Lawn Salons into the streets. Yet, they 
had little inclination to draw workers into their movement because they wanted the 
government's attention to be centered on their particular needs and demands. Only when 
the government did not respond to the students, did they encourage the workers to 
support them. The educated middle class benefits from decent jobs, satisfactory income, 
and the benefits of being a CCP member, advantages that are absent among China's 
lower classes. Consequently, members of the middle class are unlikely to oppose the 
government as long as they are satisfied with their standard of living. 
Due to the economic crisis of 2008-2009, many middle-class employees have lost 
their jobs, and some twenty million migrant workers have become unemployed owed to 
factory closings, forcing many to return to their rural villages. The government fears that 
there might be a large demonstration, such as the one in Tiananmen Square in 1989, this 
time organized by laborers and members of the middle class, protesting against 
86 
government corruption and demanding protection of their wages. Just like other 
demonstrations, new protests owed to the economic decline most likely would not call for 
fundamental changes within the Chinese government, however. Once again, protesters 
would be apt to call for the fulfillment of their individual needs, and not for the 
realization of abstract principles of democracy. 
The demonstrations of the 1980s did not reflect unity among the Chinese people 
in a call for radical political change. The protests of 1985 and 1986 were raised in 
response to the uncertainties of changing times, more than they were an expression of 
anti-government sentiments. The dismantling of communes, the neglect of millions of 
students sent to countryside and left there, the tensions between the one-child policy and 
the household responsibility system which placed an emphasis on family-based power, 
the looming end to the "iron rice bowl," spreading corruption, criticism of the Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs), and reduction in the size of the CCP and China's military 
contributed to the unrest among people who did not view Deng's modernizations 
favorably. The doubt and insecurities of the protesters in the 1980s led them to seek 
assurances from their government. Likewise, the demonstrations of 1989 were an 
outgrowth of great social strains. Inflation had reached some 26 percent by the end of 
1988, leading to panic buying and hoarding, as people confronted a decline in their living 
standards. Peasants who were forced to sell their grain quota to the government at low 
procurement prices became embittered as the government paid them in promissory notes 
that could not be used to purchase food or fuel. Strikes erupted as workers were laid off 
or their wage payments fell behind. And, educated youth came to realize that they had no 
lucrative jobs on the horizon and that they lacked the contacts, or guanxi, that customarily 
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provided them. Frustrated and displeased with their circumstances, students took to the 
streets. When top-level government officials did not respond to their appeals, the students 
felt abandoned. They saw themselves as an elite group entitled to a better life, and as 
having gained little from Deng's reforms. Cab drivers and uneducated entrepreneurs, they 
bitterly noted, were earning more than university graduates. The students raised symbols 
and used slogans of democracy at Tiananmen Square, but in truth wanted financial 
security and the prestige to which they thought they were entitled. 
The middle class might protest again if the government is perceived as not 
providing a secure economic future. However, the lesson that the students learned during 
the Tiananmen crackdown was not to underestimate the brutal determination of their 
government. Chinese authorities will do whatever they believe is necessary to protect 
their regime, including making key decisions, as occurred in 1989, that contravene even 
the CCP' s constitution. They are fearful of yielding to any demand, as this might weaken 
their monopoly on power. Concern for human rights, either domestically or abroad, does 
not play a role in shaping policy, and international image is not a factor when it comes to 
protecting existing central authority. 
Although China is marked by many injustices, the middle class is unlikely to seek 
a new political system, because its members are comfortable with what the government 
presently offers. It is not disposed to have interest in replacing the existing leadership, 
unless, perhaps, its ne eds are not met. Furthermore, the brutality of the Tiananmen 
Square crackdown and the March 2008 and March 2009 crackdowns in Tibet reminds the 
citizens of China that it is extremely difficult to oppose the Chinese government. Lessons 
learned by citizens in the past created public awareness that the government will quickly 
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suppress movements that could threaten it, leaving China hopeless regarding fundamental 
change in the regime. 
It has been twenty years since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, and to 
continue their justification of suppression, officials claim that crackdowns and other 
elements of state control are essential to preserving social stability, which, in turn, is 
essential to economic growth. This logic permits suppression of labor rights activists, 
religious protestors, and demonstrations among peasants. 
Not much has changed in China's political system since the 1989 massacre. The 
CCP still represses individuals who call for fulfillment of their human rights and civil 
liberties, and the Chinese government continues to disregard human rights abroad, by 
supporting repressive dictatorships in countries including Myanmar, Sudan, Iran, and 
Venezuela. Having the third largest economy in the world, and a rapidly building 
militarily, an increasing number of observers are concerned that China will pose a threat 
to other countries, especially in East Asia, as it reaches superpower status under a 
Leninist-style authoritarian regime. Siding with the dictatorial regimes in Sudan, Iran, 
Venezuela, and elsewhere, China supplies these ally countries with military weapons, 
technology, and resources that harm innocent civilians, such as those who have died in 
Darfur. In many ways, China's relationships with unsavory regimes erode peace efforts in 
war-torn regions, including, among other places, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. 
There is no evidence that China's integration into globalization will lead to 
China's democratization. It has been over ten years since the last country in East Asia, 
Indonesia, transitioned into democracy. Authoritarianism in East Asia runs deeply. It is 
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estimated that China's middle class will reach 40 percent of China's population by 2020, 
meaning that the Chinese government must be on guard to keep this elite class prosperous 
and satisfied. Yet, the unwritten bargain that the government made with urban elite in 
1989 is not likely to change: the educated class of China can pursue accumulation of 
wealth, as long as it remains remote from politics. Meanwhile, poor labor conditions, 
very low wages, and unfavorable conditions for human rights are likely to continue, as 
they contribute to China's global economic competitiveness. Without the unity of the 
Chinese people or their desire to demonstrate and demand fundamental change within the 
government, there will be no movement toward democracy. And, without democracy, 
there will be serious limitations to human rights and civil liberties in China for the long­ 
term future. Chinese citizens would have to gain an appreciation for abstract principles of 
democracy, before China could move toward democratization. But to realize what a true 
Western-style democracy is, would not be sufficient; the Chinese also would have to 
desire it. To date, there is no significant aspiration or momentum for democratic political 
change in China among its vast Han majority. 
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